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THE WORKING OF THE NEW HAMPSHIRE
DOCTRINE OF CRIMINAL INSANITY
JOHN P. REID*
THE WORKING OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

The New Hampshire doctrine of criminal insanity is over ninety years
old- a very respectable lifetime for a legal principle. Despite this, it is
one of the most abused and misunderstood rules in American law. It has
been nearly entombed by courts and commentators who have tended to
equate it with the Durham rule of the District of Columbia.' Durham
and New Hampshire are not the same; Durham was formulated in
response to medical criticism of the tests for insanity; New Hampshire,
on the other hand, is based on the fundamental principle of the common
law which distinguishes between questions of fact and questions of law.
The oft-stated assumption that ever since it was first expounded by
Judge Charles Doe 2 it has lain dormant-an inactive legal oddity, half
remembered but never used-is a contributing factor in the miscomprehension of the doctrine and an explanation of the inattention of the
commentators to the New Hampshire doctrine. This belief has been repeated
by friends3 as well as foes,4 and has even been supported by such comforting
but not too accurate statements as "the good people of New Hampshire
rarely indulge in murder." The truth is that the New Hampshire doctrine
has led a surprisingly active existence when we consider the size of the
state. More than that it may, perhaps, be credited with creating an
atmosphere of tolerance and cooperation between psychiatrists and lawyers
which might serve as a model in other jurisdictions. It is the purpose of
this paper to examine how the New Hampshire doctrine has worked and
to determine what contribution it has made to criminology.
THE DEFINITION OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

The New Hampshire doctrine is not so much a definition of legal

responsibility as a rejection of all definitions; it is not so much a test for
insanity as an affirmation that no satisfactory test can be devised. Unlike
the M'Naghten rule, the New Hampshire doctrine is not a principle of
* Instructor in Law, New York University; Member of the New Hampshire Bar.
1. Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
2. State v. Pike, 49 N.H. 399, 408 (1869) (concurring opinion); Broadman v.
Woodman, 47 N.H. 120, 149 (1865) (dissenting opinion).
3. Weihofen, The Flowering of New Hampshire, 22 U. CHI. L. REV. 356 (1955).
4. Note, 30 IND. L. J. 194, 211 (1955).
5. Guttmacher, The Psychiatrist as an Expert Witness, 22 U. CHI. L. REV. 325, 327
(1955). See also, Royal Commission on Capital Punishment, Report, CMD. No. 8932,
285 (1953).
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substantive law. Unlike the Durham rule, it is not a legal formula based
on the latest advances of medicine. Unlike the Model Penal Code rule,
it is not a compromise worked out by academic experts.
The New Hampshire doctrine was evolved out of the evidentiary
theories of the New Hampshire court based on research into legal history
conducted by Chief Justice Doe. It is, in essence, a rule of evidence
rather than a rule of criminal law. It owes its formulation to the New
Hampshire judges' insistence on the distinction between law and fact
(they regarded "insanity" as a question of fact), their dislike of legal
presumptions (they thought that M'Naghten was not a rule of substantive
law but rather a legal presumption, based on faulty medicine and bad
law, that a man is sane unless he does not know the difference between
right and wrong), their belief that the burden of proof (the burden of
persuasion) rests on the party who seeks to prove the legal affirmative,
and their study of history which convinced them that on the issue of legal
responsibility the courts had usurped the fact finding function of the
jury by formulating rules which not only turned questions of fact into
matters of law but also excluded the "best" evidence (such as non-expert
opinion evidence).

6

The New Hampshire doctrine, then, is a recognition that "insanity"
is a question of fact. It was first expressed by Judge Doe when he told the
jury in a murder case:
Neither delusion, nor knowledge of right and wrong, nor design
or cunning in planning and executing the killing and escaping

or avoiding detection, nor ability to recognize acquaintances,
to labor, or transact business, or manage affairs, is, as a matter
law, a test of mental disease; but all symptoms and all tests
mental disease are purely matters of fact to be determined
the jury.7
This in essence, is the New Hampshire doctrine.

or
of
of
by

THE LIMITS OF NEw HAMPSHIRE

One of the reasons given in other jurisdictions for rejecting the New
Hampshire doctrine (perhaps the major reason along with the argument
that it leaves the jury with no guides for reaching a decision) is that
"hospital authorities would be too likely to find all persons who are
charged with serious crimes to be insane."8 The prospect of allowing those
who are qualified to comment on the existence of mental disease a free
hand when reporting to the courts, seems to send a shudder down the
6. For a full treatment of the evolution of the New Hampshire rule out of Doe's
theories on the law of evidence, see, Reid, A Speculative Novelty: Judge Doe's Search
for Reaon in the Law of Evidence, 39 B.U.L. REv. 321 (1959).
7. State v. Jones, 50 N.H. 369 (1871) (syllabus).
8. Weihofen, Eliminating the Battle of Experts in Criminal Insanity Cases,

48 MIcH. L. REv. 961, 970 (1950).
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spines of judges and prosecutors in many jurisdictions. The experience
in New Hampshire shows this fear is groundless. The psychiatrists in
that state have been no more willing than the legal profession or the
judiciary to find excuses for exculpating wrong-doers.9 It apparently never
ceases to surprise some lawyers to learn that many psychiatrists believe in
punishment. 10
The attitude of psychiatrists can not be ignored in any consideration
of the scope and limits of the New Hampshire doctrine. Procedure for
identifying and disposing of the criminally insane in New Hampshire has
become formalized. The question of whether an accused is insane is almost
always raised by the State, which files a petition asking that the accused
be committed to the State Hospital for examination. With hardly an
exception the finding of the State Hospital as to whether the respondent
was sane or insane at the time the crime was committed and whether he
is now competent to stand trial is accepted by both the prosecution
and the defense. Thus, from a practical point of view, the scope of the
New Hampshire doctrine is determined by psychiatrists at the State
Hospital and turns to a great extent upon what type and intensity of
mental disease and illness they are willing to certify as coming within
the meaning of "insanity."
It is difficult, however, to determine the scope of the New Hampshire
doctrine as applied by the State psychiatrists since, when reporting a
person insane, they do not specify what type of disease he is suffering
from. During the first decade of the century when the reports were more
detailed, the Hospital certified and the courts accepted as insane, respondents

9. In evaluating what significance can be attributed to the reports of the New
Hampshire State Hospital cited and quoted throughout this paper, it should be noted
that it is one of only thirteen fully approved state hospitals in the United States,
according to the Central Inspection Board Report of 1955. Report to the Governor
of New Hampshire by the American Psychiatric Association entitled A MENTAL HEALTH
PROGRAM FOR NEw HAMPSHIRE 255 (1958).
10. For example, Dr. Henry Yellowlees told the Royal Commission on Capital
Punishment in 1950 (at par. 7291):

It was well said of a criminal some years ago that he was suffering from mental
illness, but that the mental illness was a kind for which the best and only
treatment was hanging by the neck. That was rather cynically put, but I think
it was right. I do not for a moment say that no man who is mentally ill
should be hanged.
Later Dr. Yellowlees was questioned by a fellow psychiatrist.
"7394. (Dr. Slater): You said at the beginning of your evidence, in answer to
a question from the Chairman, that you thought it was perfectly proper that some
insane persons should be executed?- I think I said 'mentally ill.'
"7395. Yes, that some mentally ill persons should be executed. Can you tell
me what function execution has in such a case? What good does it do?- It protects
society. It serves as a warning to other people, and it is the kindest way of dealing
with a patient who will never be anything hut a torment to society and himself.

"7396. Society can protect itself by other means, can it not? - Undoubtedly."
Royal Commission on Capital Punishment, Minutes of Evidence, Twenty-third day,

Thursday, June 1, 1950, pp. 534, 539.
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indicted for murder whose conditions were characterized as "hypochon3
12
driasis,""l "organic brain degeneration,"' and "chronic dementia."'
It is, instead, easier to determine the limits beyond which the State
psychiatrists have refused to go. This is because, when reporting a respondent
to be sane, they quite often mention to the court mental conditions they
have diagnosed in the particular patient but which they do not regard
as amounting to insanity. An obvious example is feeblemindedness' 4 which,
like mental deficiency, 15 is not equated with "insanity" in any jurisdiction
despite the warnings of some writers that this will be the result of any
relaxation of the M'Naghten rules.16 Similar categories are those of the
sociopathic or psychopathic personalities. The State Hospital has consistently reported that a sociopathic personality without psychosis is not
insane. 7 The same is true for psychopathic personalities which do not

11. State v. Marcoux, Strafford Criminal Docket No. 436 (1907).
12. State v. Glass, Strafford Criminal Docket No. 127 (1902). In this case the
defendant was indicted for murder of his brother. A psychiatrist obtained by his
family wrote to the court that he committed the act under the influence of delusions
of conspiracy and that he was insane at the time. On petition by the County Solicitor
the Court ordered him committed for observation to the State Hospital which
reported: "Glass is suffering from organic brain degeneration, that he has as the
result of such disease hallucinations of the special senses, systematized delusions and
impaired will power and that he is consequently insane and irresponsible." As a result
of this report the State accepted the plea of "not guilty by reason of insanity." Glass
is one of several persons adjudged criminally insane who have been committed to the
New Hampshire State Prison rather than the State Hospital.
13. State v. Morgan, Strafford Criminal Docket No. 435 (1907).
14. State v. Merchand, Strafford Criminal Docket No. 2347 (1947) (arson).
15. In one case the State Hospital reported that the patient committed for pre-trial
observation was "not mentally ill" but was "functioning at a mentally deficient level
of intelligence." As a result the County Solicitor moved that the court commit the
defendant to a special school. State v. Kennedy, Strafford Equity Docket No. 7611 (1957).
16. When the Durham rule was formulated with the words "mental disease and
defect" one psychiatrist thought the flood gates had been opened:
Mental defect in this part of the definition seems to indicate defective
brain tissue. .

.

. Mental defect would include mental deficiency as it is

usually understood. Here again the criteria for irresponsibility are liberalized
because if the individual were a high grade moron who was quite aware of
what he was doing, the psychiatrist would have to testify that he was
suffering from a mental defect.
Cavanagh, A Psychiatrist Looks at the Durham Decision, 5 CATHOLIC U. L. REV.
25, 31 (1955).
This criticism was leveled at the Durham rule and has no validity in regard
to New Hampshire which places no emphasis upon the words "disease" and "defect"
but leaves them as questions of fact for the jury. Reid, Understanding the New
Hampshire Doctrine of Criminal Insanity, 69 YALE L.J. 367, 391 (1960). In the
two jurisdictions in which insanity is a question of fact for the jury - New Hampshire
and Scotland - a line has been drawn at mental deficiency. For a Scots case involving
a plea in bar see, H. M. Advocate v. Breen, [1921] Just. Cas. 30, 38 (Scot.) (but
for an unusual New Hampshire situation involving feeblemindedness see Appendix D).
17. In one case the Hospital reported "that he [i.e., the defendant] is not insane
and that he is competent to stand trial, even though he is suffering from a sociopathic
personality." State v. Mansfield, Strafford Criminal Docket No. 2689 (1953) (breaking,
entering and larceny). In a similar case the Hospital reported: "Psychiatric examination
revealed no abnormalities or psychotic determinants. Neurological examination was
negative. Psychological examination revealed characteristics of sociopathic personality
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have an undiagnosed psychosis.18 It seems to be virtually a policy that a
person will :not be certified as criminally insane unless he is a psychotic.
This was clearly demonstrated by the Staff conference, held to discuss a
pedophilic indicted for first degree murder, which is set forth in Appendix A.
Almost everyone felt the patient was a psychopath, but very few were
willing to say he had a psychosis, and as a result he was certified as sane,
and subsequently tried, convicted and hanged. The outcome seemed to
hinge on whether he could be labeled a psychotic, not whether he had
a mental illness which might be explained to a jury. As one doctor put
it, "I agree it is a character neurosis but what else can you call it besides
psychopathic personality- and if there isn't any evidence of psychosis you
have to face that and call him not insane and let him face punishment
for his crime."' 9 This is not a correct interpretation of the New Hampshire
doctrine.
The New Hampshire doctrine of criminal insanity is based on the
fundamental proposition that whether or not a defendant was suffering
from insanity at the time of the criminal act (and should not be held
responsible) is a question of fact. It not only rejects the notion that
there is a universal test for determining insanity (in effect a legal presumption that "insanity" can exist only in relation to well-defined characteristics),
but it also rejects the notion that "insanity" is limited to certain diagnosed
types of mental disease which can be labeled with such clinical designations
as "psychosis." It is the fact and not the nomenclature which is the pivot
of New Hampshire. It is for the jury to say whether a described mental
disorder without evidence of organic or functional psychosis. Electro-encephalogram done
on November 30th was within normal limits.
"As a result of this total evaluation, the conclusion is that he is without mental
disorder and is competent to stand trial. There are no contributing organic or functional
factors which would account for his behavioral pattern." State v. Woods, Strafford
Criminal Docket No. 2912 (1956) (breaking and entering).
18. In one case the State psychiatrist reported that the defendant
but in my opinion he has a psychopathic personality." State v.

is not insane,
Sheehy, Strafford

"...

Criminal Docket No. 2271 (1945) (murder).
In the case of a seventeen year old killer the report read: "As a result of my
examination of Harvey Blake on December 2, 1953, as requested by the court, I find
that he is responsible for his acts. However, it is to be noted that he has shown
definite psychopathic traits for several years past, but these psychopathic traits do not
make him insane or irresponsible." State v. Blake, Merrimack State Docket No. 9473
(1953) (murder). This case shows that psychiatrists, when given a free hand to define
insanity as they are in New Hampshire (subject to the jury's redefinition), will not
always confuse the abnormal with the irresponsible. Here is how the defendant
described the crime:
I shot him on purpose. I shot twice. I walked onto the field, up to the

wood pile and he was standing there and he had a dollar bill in his hand

and put it in his pocketbook, only I thought it was more. I didn't know
what I was doing. I pointed the gun up there and let it go off. He fell down.
I guess he was still breathing. He said, 'You might as well finish me off, you
started it.' So I put another bullet in and shot that one. Then I took the
pocketbook and found it was a dollar bill and that is when everything
started to turn black and I found I was running up the road and that is all
till I got home. I put my gun up on the rack, my belt back in the drawer
and went and ate supper.
19. See Appendix A, p. 45, lines 2-5.
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disease (be it a psychosis or not), in the light of all the facts, amounts to
legal insanity which will excuse criminal liability. If the jury considered
that a psychotic was responsible for his actions it would not matter that
the same defendant if tried in a M'Naghten jurisdiction would be entitled
to a directed verdict of not guilty.20 By the same token it is for the jury
to characterize as "insanity" or as mere deviations in normal personality
such mental illnesses as acute and chronic brain disorders, psychophysiologic
autonomic visceral (psychosomatic disorders), psychoneurotic disorders, and
personality disorders (psychopathic personalities). This, in theory, is the
scope of the New Hampshire doctrine.
The theory has never been fully tested in practice primarily because
the State Hospital has limited its definition of insanity to psychosis and
defense counsel in New Hampshire has shown a remarkable willingness
to go along with whatever the Hospital says. This policy on the part of
the Hospital may be criticized from a medical point of view, 21 but it
seems to be perfectly correct from the legal perspective. For, after all,
when the court asks the Hospital for a report on the respondent's mental
condition, it is asking the Hospital for an opinion as to whether that
mental condition excuses the criminal act. When the Hospital reports
that the man is "sane" it is doing nothing more than expressing the
belief of the Staff that no mental disease existed at the time of the act
which, in their opinion, exculpates the defendant. By adding that the
defendant, while not "insane," is a psychopath, the report, in effect,
"hands the ball" to the defense counsel who, on the whole, have refused
to run with it. Thus the limits of the New Hampshire doctrine have
been fixed short of psychopathy partly by the Hospital's policy of limiting
"insanity" to psychosis, and also, and perhaps even more important
by defense lawyers in New Hampshire who either agree that "insanity" is
limited to psychosis (i.e., they do not believe a jury will find anyone
but a psychotic "insane") or else have failed to realize the full scope
22
of the New Hampshire doctrine.
The limits to the New Hampshire doctrine can be set only by the
jury, not by alienists or defense counsel. It is for the jury to say whether
or not psychopathy comes within the area of "insanity." A New Hampshire
jury, unlike a Durham jury, does not do this by deciding whether a
20. This marks one of the major differences between the New Hampshire doctrine
and the Durham rule. In the District of Columbia a jury verdict will be overturned
if it ignores what the alienists and the Court of Appeals consider to be the area
of insanity.
21. "[U]nder the New Hampshire and the Durham Rules, the only ground on
which it can be said that a sociopath was not insane, would be the declaration that
sociopathy is not a mental disease. Psychopathic personality would be in the same
category. The District of Columbia Court has held, of course, that whether a
sociopath is mentally diseased is a question of fact which should be decided by the
jury. I am in agreement with this myself. There are all degrees of sociopathy and doubtless
the juries' verdicts will depend in a large measure on the severity of the disorder."
Personal Letter From Manfred S. Guttmacher to John Reid, March 1, 1960.
22. This seems to be the true explanation, as will be seen later.
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"psychopath" is "insane," 23 but whether or not a particular defendant,
who is diagnosed as a psychopath, was responsible for a criminal act he
is found to have committed. They are dealing with a question of fact,
24
not a question of tests or labels.
Among the questions of fact which a New Hampshire jury might
properly consider is the fact that some psychiatrists do not believe that
psychopathy should excuse criminal liability.2 It is for the jury to decide
how much weight should be given to this "fact." It is not surprising
however that some New Hampshire prosecutors have interpreted this medical
opinion as settling the question as a matter of law. Thus an Attorney
General once stated that "the psychopath is sane in every respect. As far
as the medical attitude is concerned, the psychopath is a sane person and
not an insane person." 26 This may be good medicine (and, if good
medicine, good law in a Durham jurisdiction), but it is merely evidence
27
to be considered by the jury under the New Hampshire doctrine.
Whether a jury would regard a psychopath as criminally insane is
doubtful. In a Scottish case involving diminished responsibility, the prosecutor argued that the term "psychopathic personality" was "something so
nebulous that only a psychiatrist could attach any meaning to it." ' 2 8 The
judge, however, allowed the jury to consider whether the psychopath-

23. The Durham approach places a greater stress on labels: "But it is for the
jury, not the judge, to decide whether a given psychiatric diagnosis (i.e., psychopathy],
if accepted, brings the accused within the legal definition of insanity." Taylor v.
United States, 222 F.2d 398, 404 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
24. The problem of the psychopath recently troubled the New Jersey Court which,
in rejecting the Durham rule, asked: "Is, for instance, the diagnostic label 'psychopathy'
a mental disease or defect?" State v. Lucas, 30 N.J. 37, 71, 152 A.2d 50, 68 (1959).
This points up one of the difficulties with the Durham stress on "disease" and
"defect," a problem that does not exist under the New Hampshire doctrine. See note 16
supra (but see also note 83 infra). The New Jersey court did not consider the New
Hampshire doctrine, probably in the belief that rejection of Durham is rejection of
New Hampshire.
25. In 1950 Dr. Henry Yellowlees was asked to name some clinical classes which
might be held responsible for crime even though "certificably insane." He replied:
I think the answer is that the chief class that might be held responsible,
although they could be held also certifiably insane, are those people who
are now very loosely termed 'psychopaths' . . . . in that broad group which
are called psychopaths you have a large number of persons many of whom
could quite well be certified and many of whom should and could he held
responsible for what they do.
Royal Commission on Capital Punishment, Minutes of Evidence, Twenty-third Day,
Thursday, June 1, 1950, par. 7328, p. 536. See also Note, 10 RUTGERS L. REV. 425,
435 (1955).
26. Tiffany, Background of the Sexual Psychopath Law, in PuB. N. H. MEDIcoLEGAL SOCIETY 27, 29 (1954).
27. This is especially evident when we consider that in the same speech the
Attorney General admitted: "This disease [sexual psychopathy] renders them irresponsible
for sex acts. This disease is somewhat similar to that of an insane person in regards
to his general action." Id. at 28.
28. Carraher v. H. M. Advocate, [1946] just. Cas. 108, 115 (Scot.).
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defendant came within the scope of diminished responsibility 29 and the
jury found that he did not. The significance of this case, so far as the
New Hampshire doctrine is concerned, is that the jury in rejecting the
application of diminished responsibility to a psychopath was rejecting it
only for this psychopath-defendant on the basis of the facts in this one
case. And when the Scottish judges on appeal refused to reverse the
verdict on the defendant's argument that a medical finding of psychopathy
should lead automatically to a legal finding of diminished responsibility,
they were not holding that psychopathy could never be related to diminished
responsibility.30 The same would be true in any New Hampshire insanity
case. The facts and not the concepts would control.31 It is submitted,
therefore, that defense counsel operating in a New Hampshire jurisdiction
could, and in some cases should, challenge a finding by the State

Psychiatrists that a psychopath is not insane, and take the question to the
29. Actually, in his instructions, the trial judge put the issues to the jury in
conceptual terms:
They [the alienists] say the accused is a psychopathic personality; they have
told us what they understand by psychopathic personality, and the defence
says proof of psychopathic personality is enough for a jury to hold a man
has diminished responsibility. Well, it is for you to say in the light of what
I have read to you as the law regulating diminished responsibility whether
there really is evidence to support in your judgment this defence ...
Carraher v. H. M. Advocate, [1946] Just. Cas. 108, 112 (Scot.).
30. This was brought out during the questioning of the Vice-Dean of the
Faculty of Advocates (the Scottish Bar Association) by the Royal Commission on
Capital Punishment.
Supposing as medical science developed, it appeared that the view which
the Court had taken of these psychopathic personalities who were ruled
out in the case of Carraher was wrong, and that they really were suffering
from some form of mental disease, would it be possible for the Courts to
give effect to that advance of knowledge and bring them within the sphere
of diminished responsibility without the Carraher verdict being reversed? I think so, because the evidence would be different. If it was shown at a
later stage that Carraher, who had a psychopathic personality was really
suffering from an impairment of his intellect by disease, then he would come
within the diminished responsibility rule. What the Judges protested against
in the Carraher case was the acceptance of medical evidence which merely
applied epithets to the man.
Royal Commission on Capital Punishment, Minutes of Evidence, Nineteenth Day,
April 5, 1950, par. 5628, p. 450. It has since been held in England (where, as
distinguished from Scotland, diminished responsibility has been established by statute
and not by judicial precedent) that evidence of psychopathic personality is not
irrelevent in establishing the plea of diminished responsibility. R. v. Dunbar, [1957]
2 All E.R. 737 (Crim. App.).
31. This is also true in Scotland as the Crown Agent, L. I. Gordon, noted:
"The question is, was the accused when he inflicted the injuries in such a condition
as to form the intention to kill or do serious harm. If not then it is immaterial that
his mental condition, though one of perfect sanity, may be described as psychopathic
personality." Royal Commission on Capital Punishment, Minutes of Evidence, Seventh
Day, November 3, 1949, par. 10, p. 170.
Judge Bazelon, the originator of the Durham rule, has said much the same thing.
The law does not attach consequences to medical labels. Legal consequences
depend rather upon the jury's determination, from all the facts, as to the
individual's mental health or illness. Testimony that the individual suffers
from a named condition, e.g., psychosis or psychopathy, is of aid to the
jury only to the extent that the jury is otherwise informed of the nature
of the condition.
Lyles v. United States, 254 F.2d 725, 734-5 note 4 (D.C. Cir. 1957) (dissenting opinion).
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jury. This has been done in M'Naghten jurisdictions, 3 2 and while most
psychopaths are found responsible and hanged,3 3 some M'Naghten juries
have found them "not guilty by reason of insanity." 34 If this can be done
under the M'Naghten rules it is all the more reason why it can be done
under the New Hampshire doctrine where the defendant has a right to
have such matters determined by the jury as questions of fact and should
not have his fate settled by medical fiat.
The view of the New Hampshire State Hospital that a psychopath 3is5
not "insane" has been challenged in only one important case, State v. Long.
Long was a pedophilic who, rather than risk detection, killed a young boy
who stubbornly and courageously resisted his advances. After his arrest
it was discovered that he had killed another boy under much the same
circumstances in another county. At the conference of the Staff of the
State Hospital (the transcript of which is reproduced in Appendix A)
it was fairly well agreed that Long was a psychopath. There was disagreement, however, as to whether he was "insane." The Superintendent, who
considered he was "sane, '"l was disturbed by this, 3 7 and, suppressing the
opinions of his subordinates, reported to the court that Long was sane.
He called .him a "crooked stick," "in the twilight zone"38 and told the
jury that "Long has no mental disease."3 9 The defense, insisting Long was
a "Mental Leper,"40 pleaded the statutory defense of "not guilty by reason
of mental derangement" which is in the nature of a plea of confession
41
and avoidance which concedes the commission of the physical act charged.
As a result the only issues at the trial were whether Long was insane
and whether he should be hanged. 42 The State called at least thirty-three
witnesses, only one of whom, the Superintendent of the State Hospital,
was a psychiatrist. The defense produced nine witnesses, several of whom
32. People v. Hector, 104 Cal. App.2d 392, 231 P.2d 916 (1951); State v. Maish,
29 Wash.2d 52, 185 P.2d 486 (1948).
33. R. v. Rivett, 34 Cr. App. R. 87 (1950).

34. GUTTMACHER & WEIHOFEN, PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW 94 (1952). Fifteen
days after Durham was handed down the District of Columbia Court held that it had
been error for a trial judge, operating under the combined M'Naghten-irresistible
impulse tests, to instruct the jury that a psychopath "is not insane within the
meaning of the law." Stewart v. United States, 214 F.2d 879, 881 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
35. 90 N.H. 103, 4 A.2d 865, 6 A.2d 752 (1939).
36. The Superintendent was Dr. Dolloff, and, as will be discussed later, he
believed the test for insanity was or should be whether the defendant knew what
he was doing was wrong.
37. "I am so emotionally upset by the unanimity of opinion that the man is
insane that I am thrown off balance and don't know what to do." Appendix A,
pp. 46-47.
38. Tiffany, Background of the Sexual Psychopath Law, in Pua. N. H. MEDICOLEcAL SOCIETY

27, 29 (1954).

39. The Laconia (N.H.) Evening Citizen, Dec. 10, 1937, p. 1, col. 7. "I would
says [sic] that Howard Long is not insane; that he comes within the limits of sanity."
40. The Laconia (N.H.) Evening Citizen, Dec. 13, 1937, p. 1, cols. 6 & 7.
41. State v. Forcier, 95 N.H. 341, 63 A.2d 235 (1949); State v. Long, 90 N.H.
103, 106, 4 A.2d 865, 6 A.2d 752 (1939). The defense of insanity raised under the
general issue is not an admission of the act.
42. In New Hampshire the issue of capital punishment is resolved by the jury.
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were alienists.43 The question which the jury had to decide was whether
this psychopath, whom nearly everyone considered dangerous because of
his mental condition, was, as the Superintendent of the State Hospital
insisted, sane or whether he was insane. Thus for the first and apparently
only time the New Hampshire doctrine was being tested in a capital case
involving a psychopath.4 4 Unfortunately, however, it cannot be considered
a fair test because after correctly instructing the jury that there was no
test "as a matter of law," the presiding judge contradicted himself by
saying:
Whether the respondent had sufficient mental capacity to entertain a criminal intent is a question of fact for the jury. Was he
so far deficient that he was not able to form or to entertain
a criminal intent? If so, then his acts were the product and
result of his abnormal mental condition. If, on the other hand,
he had the mental ability to appreciate what he was doing, and
sufficient mental power to control his actions, then reason must
have prompted his acts, they were not caused or produced by
insanity, but were assented to and concurred in by his will, and
were, therefore criminal.
Thus the judge did, in effect, establish a "test" of sorts, but whether
the jury followed his earlier statement that there is no test or whether
it felt bound to convict if it found the defendant was able "to appreciate
what he was doing and [had] sufficient mental power to control his
actions," the fact remains that the Long case offers us our best illustration
of the relationship of psychopathy to the New Hampshire doctrine. Aside
from the unfortunate wording of the charge it was a correct application
of the doctrine, for the true test should be not whether the Superintendent
believed that a defendant who comes within the term "psychopath" is
sane, but whether the jury, on the basis of all the evidence, thought this
defendant was responsible. The decision that Long was guilty of murder
in the first degree seems correct, not because the jury followed the
rejected right-wrong test which the State Hospital was still applying at
43. Brief for State, p. 7, State v. Long, 90 N.H. 103, 4 A.2d 865, 6 A.2d 752 (1939).

44. This is not the only time a psychopath has been charged with murder in

New Hampshire. Rather it is the only capital case in which the defense challenged the

State Hospital's determination that a psychopath is not insane. In 1953, for example,
a seventeen year old boy was committed to the hospital for observation after he was
accused of murder. The criminal psychiatrist at the Hospital reported to the court that
the boy was not insane although he was a psychopath. ("As a result of my examination
of Harvey Blake on December 2, 1953, as requested by the court, I find that he is
responsible for his acts. However, it is to be noted that he has shown definite
psychopathic traits for several years past, but these psychopathic traits do not make
him insane or irresponsible.") (also quoted in footnote 18 supra). The boy's courtappointed counsel decided not to challenge this report, perhaps because the State
was not asking for the death penalty, and the defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment.
State v. Blake, Merrimack State Docket No. 9473 (1953).
For a case of first degree murder in which the defense psychiatrist thought the
defendant was a psychopath although the Director of Correctional Psychiatry at the
State Hospital did not mention it in his report that the young defendant was sane,
see State v. Rankin, Strafford Criminal Docket No. 3230 (1960).
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that time, but because, on the special facts of the case, 45 twelve average
people could easily, without difficulty, agree that Long was not suffering
from any mental disease which was responsible for the criminal act, or
could be said to excuse the criminal act, or of which the criminal act
could be considered to be the product.
The Long case does not prove that a psychopath who does not have
a psychosis could not successfully plead insanity under the New Hampshire
doctrine. The most it shows is that, given the same set of facts, an
American jury is not likely to return a verdict of not guilty by reason of
insanity, and that a psychopath has a hard row to hoe if he wishes to
convince a jury that he is insane and therefore not responsible for his
criminal acts by reason of psychopathy alone. The limits of the New
Hampshire doctrine have not been set by State v. Long, nor will they be
set by any one case or combination of cases as long as insanity remains
a pure question of fact.
What State v. Long does do is shed light on the various interpretations
which have been given the New Hampshire doctrine. For, had the jury
interpreted the New Hampshire doctrine in the same way the California
Supreme Court did (when it rejected it),41 that is, that the defendant
should be adjudged insane if the act would not have been committed
"had the taint not existed," then it would have found Long not guilty by
reason of insanity because undoubtedly be would not have gotten into
the predicament which led to the killing of the boy if he had not
suffered from pedophilia. Rather, they followed an interpretation of the
New Hampshire doctrine which either agreed with Professor Weihofen
that "the mental disease must be such as to have rendered the defendant
incapable of the guilty intent required to constitute the crime" 47 or with
the theory that it makes insanity purely a question of fact.
Even had the Long jury accepted the notion that the concept of psychopathic personality should be equated with legal insanity, it would not mean
that juries in other jurisdictions which might adopt the New Hampshire
doctrine would necessarily do likewise. In New Hampshire the defendant
need only introduce "some" evidence of mental disorder to rebut the
45. After his first burst of anger at being rejected had resulted in physical injury
to the boy, Long attempted to comfort his victim and bandaged' the wound he had

inflicted. It was while he was doing this that he apparently reflected on the danger
which the boy, if he talked, represented to his freedom. (Long had a record of
institutionalization.) He then dragged the boy to a secluded spot, murdered him, and

very methodically attempted to cover his tracks. He might have escaped detection

had not the police been able to place him near the scene of the crime by the marks
his automobile tires left on the dirt road.
46. People v. Hubert, 119 Cal. 216, 51 Pac. 329 (1897).
47. WEIHOFEN, MENTAL DISORDER AS A CRIMINAL DEFENSE 116 (1954). Whether
or not Professor Weihofen is correct in his belief that the New Hampshire doctrine
rests "upon the fundamental principle that criminal responsibility requires a guilty
intent, or mens rea, as well as a prohibited act" (Id. at 113) is a matter which has
not yet been settled by the courts. For a contrary view see Reid, Understanding the
New Hampjshire Doctrine of Criminal Insanity, 69 YALE L.J. 367, 383-6, 395-6 (1960).
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presumption of sanity. Once this is done the burden is shifted to the
prosecution not only to prove sanity but to prove it beyond a reasonable
doubt.48 In this regard New Hampshire represents one extreme. In many
jurisdictions this is not the rule. In some the prosecution need prove
sanity only by a preponderance of the evidence. In others the burden
of going forwArd does not shift and the defendant still has the onus of
proving his insanity, either by a preponderance of the evidence or even
beyond a reasonable doubt. Thus, whether or not a defendant could
successfully argue that a mental disorder is "insanity" could well depend
on the burden of proof required. If the defendant must prove his insanity
beyond a reasonable doubt he would probably have to show a greater
sickness (or degree of sickness) than if he need only prove it by a
balance of probabilities, and a much greater sickness than if the State must
prove his sanity either by a preponderance of the evidence or beyond a
reasonable doubt. The, fact that a New Hampshire jury, which was told
that the burden rested on the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt
that a psychopathic defendant was sane, nevertheless found that Long was
not insane, shows that other jurisdictions which refuse to adopt the New
Hampshire doctrine because there would be no telling where it might lead
are basing their argument on a false premise. The limits of New Hampshire
are fixed by the practical common sense of American jurors, a factor which
is entitled to more credit than it usualy receives from courts which refuse
to consider any modification of the M'Naghten rules.
If anything, it is easier to delineate the outer limits of the New
Hampshire doctrine than the inner. This was demonstrated by one case
in which the jury found the defendant to be medically insane but not
legally insane.49 The Supreme Court upheld the verdict and the defendant
was hanged. This marks one of the chief differences between Durham and
New Hampshire. The Durham rule, which is oriented on medicine, requires
that such a verdict be set aside if the psychiatric evidence agrees he is
medically insane.50 It gives the jury a free hand in the area of exculpation,
but places restrictions (in the form of appellate review) on the jury's
warrant to convict.,' The New Hampshire doctrine, on the other hand,
leaves the question of fact to the jury and any determination that a
"medically insane" defendant was legally responsible for his criminal actions
is, in effect, a resolution of that question of fact which is solely within
the province of the jury and can not be disturbed.
Courts in other jurisdictions as well as writers have criticized the New
Hampshire doctrine because it places no limit on exculpation. But they
48. See the charge to the jury in State v. DeMandel, Rockingham State Docket
No. 4513 (1959).

49. State v. Jones, 50 N.H. 369, 375 (1871) (defendant's argument).
50. Fielding v. United States, 251 F.2d 878 (D.C. Cir. 1957); Wright v. United
States, 250 F.2d 4 (D.C. Cir. 1957); Douglas v. United States, 239 F.2d 52
(D.C. Cir. 1956).
51. Reid, Understanding the New Hampshire Doctrine of Criminal Responsibility,
69 YALE L.J. 367, 389-91 (1960).

26

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[VOL. XV

have been thinking in terms of concepts developed from the operation
of M'Naghten and Durhan which are legal rules or theories. The New
Hampshire doctrine is not theoretical but practical. It is not a rule of law
but a rule of practice which can be judged only by how it operates. And
jurors being what they are the most valid criticism of the New Hampshire
doctrine might well be, not that it gives juries too great a license to
exculpate, but that it gives them too great a license for holding mentally
ill defendants responsible for their acts. It is significant that no prosecutor
has been found in New Hampshire who criticizes the doctrine.
THE FAILING Or

NEw

HAMPSHIRE

As has been previously suggested, State v. Long is an exception to
New Hampshire practice. In most cases the issue is resolved by the report
of the State Hospital since in almost every instance it is accepted by both
the defense and the prosecution.5 2 As a result, any weaknesses in the
operation of the New Hampshire doctrine are weaknesses in procedure
peculiar to that state, and not in the doctrine itself.
One apparent weakness to the casual observer is the brevity of the
State Hospital's reports. At the turn of the century these reports contained
information necessary to both the defense and the prosecution in deter3
mining whether a finding of sanity or insanity should be challenged.
54
Today, however, the reports content themselves mainly with informing
the court whether the State Hospital found the defendant "sane" or
"insane.' 55 Although defense counsel may obtain an account of what the
State Psychiatrists found by filing motions for discovery, 56 they usually
tend to rely upon the Hospital's determination, without attempting to
ascertain what it means by the concept "insanity."
This does not seem to be in the best interest of defendants (at least
those few who would prefer to be found insane rather than guilty) because,
quite often, the Hospital has defined "insanity" far short of what may be
52. No case has been found in which the prosecution rejected the finding of the
State Hospital that a defendant was insane.
53. For examples of these turn-of-the-century reports see State v. Glass, Strafford
Criminal Docket No. 127 (1902)

(sec

note 12 supra); State v.

Morgan, Strafford

Criminal Docket No. 435 (1907).
54. For examples of more recent reports see Appendix D; supra notes 15, 17, 18;
infra notes 55, 57, 135, 136.
55. The word "insanity" has often been criticized by psychiatrists as a legal term
which has little validity in medicine. Yet, the psychiatrsts at the State Hosptal persist

in using it to the exclusion of all others. In only a few instances has the word "insanity"

been supplemented by terms like "responsible" (see report in State v. Blake, Merrimack
State Docket No. 9473 (1953) supra notes 18 and 44) or "disease affecting his mind
which would result in the acts." State v. Bernard, Strafford Criminal Docket No. 2867
( 19 5 1is is to inform you that the observation and
study of Lloyd G. Bernard,
committed to this hospital on August 16, 1957, have been completed.
Examination reveals that the patient does not have a disease affecting his
mind which would result in the acts which led to his arrest. In my opinion
he is, therefore, not insane and is free of mental disease so that he is competent
to participate in legal proceedings.
56. See the motions which were granted in State v. Rankin, Strafford Criminal
Docket No. 3230 (1960).
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argued before a jury under the New Hampshire doctrine. For one thing,
the State Psychiatrists seem to require that a causal relationship exist
between the mental disease and the criminal act.57 This is not implicit in
the New Hampshire doctrine. Whether or not a causal link must be
discovered between the disease and the. act in order for the defendant to
be found "not guilty by reason of insanity" is a question of fact for the
jury. 58 It is perfectly proper for the prosecution to argue to the jury that
it should not find a defendant irresponsible for his actions unless it also
finds that these actions were caused by mental disease, and it is also
just as proper for the State Psychiatrist, on the witness stand, to support his
argument. But for defense counsel in New Hampshire to automatically
accept a report by the State Hospital that the defendant is not insane,
without determining whether this is based on the fact that the State
Psychiatrists were unable to find a connection between the alleged crime and
a diagnosed mental illness, could greatly affect the rights of his client.
Of course, most defense counsel would seriously doubt the chances of
persuading a jury that the respondent should not be held accountable if
they are unable to show that the criminal act was caused by a mental
disease59 (even when the State Psychiatrist readily admits that the defendant
is suffering from mental disease). Yet there is always a possibility that
the jury will feel no connection need be shown or that an alienist can
be found to testify that such a connection either does exist or need not
exist. 0o
A second factor which defense counsel in a New Hampshire jurisdiction
should consider, before accepting a report by a court-appointed psychiatrist
57. An example of this is found in some reports like the following: "Examination
reveals that the patient does not have a disease affecting his- mind which would
result in the acts which led to his arrest. In my opinion he is, therefore, not
insane .... .State
v. Bernard, Strafford Criminal Docket No. 2867 (1957). "Our
determination of the question is based . .. [on] whether the individual was suffering
from some form of mental illness, disease, or derangement which could account for
the commission of the crime." Personal Letter From Harrison M. Baker, M.D., Director
of Correctional Psychiatry, New Hampshire State Hospital, to John Reid, March 30, 1960.
58. Judge Doe, the originator of the New Hampshire doctrine, instructed a jury,
"Whether an act may be produced by partial insanity where no connection can be
discovered between the act and disease, is a question of fact." State v. Jones, 50 N.H. 369
(1871). See discussion, Reid, Understandingthe New Hampshire Doctrine of Criminal
Responsibility, 69 YALE L.J. 367, 392-4 (1960). It must be admitted, however, that
some commentators have interpreted the New Hampshire doctrine as requiring causation.
Wechsler, The Criteria of Criminal Responsibility, 22*U. CHI. L. REV. 367, 370 (1955);
Weihofen, The Flowering of New Hampshire, 22 U. CHI. L. REv. 356, 360 (1955);
Note, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 1153, 1155 (1954); Brief of Amicus Curiae, p. 30,
Steward v. United States, 214 F.2d 879 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
59. It may be that this is what happened in State v. Jones. That the jury thought
Jones responsible even though he was "insane" may be explained either by the fact
that they felt the "insanity" was not of a serious enough degree to excuse, or else
they found there was no causal connection between the "insanity" and the uxoricide
and that such a connection must be shown to justify a verdict of "not guilty by reason
of insanity."
60. Some psychiatrists believe that the attempt to prove causation (an integrated
requirement of the Durham rule) is meaningless: "Mental illness does not cause
one to commit a crime nor does mental illness produce a crime." Roche, Criminality
and Mental Illness - Two Faces of the Same Coin, 22 U. CHI. L. REV. 320, 322 (1955).
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that his client is "sane," is that sometimes these experts based their
judgments solely upon the old tests for insanity, such as the M'Naghten
rules. Again, it is perfectly proper for the prosecution under the New
Hampshire doctrine to argue before a jury that the defendant should be
held responsible if he knew that what he was doing was wrong. The
important distinction between New Hampshire and a M'Naghten jurisdiction
is that, unlike a Durham jury,6 1 a New Hampshire jury may accept or
reject the right-wrong test. The correctness of M'Naghten is, in effect, a
question of fact. The New Hampshire doctrine breaks down procedurally
when the State Hospital certifies a man to be "sane" on the basis of the
M'Naghten rules or the irresistible impulse test, and defense counsel accepts
the report without questioning the reasoning behind it.
It is ironic that some psychiatrists have been condemning the M'Naghten
rules and the irresistible impulse test ever since they were formulated,
while in the one state where they have not been law for over ninety years
other psychiatrists have often applied them as the sole criteria for determining the accountability of persons accused of crime. During the 1930s,
for example, the Superintendent of the State Hospital consistently applied
the M'Naghten right-wrong test. 2 He believed that there were four
"essential" types of insanity - the deluded type, dementia, depression,
and the elated type.6" He told the jury in the Long case that there were
two types of insane persons "who hang their heads in apparent shame.
Long belongs to neither of these two classes."16 4 It may also be that he
applied the irresistible impulse test to Long; although, if he did, it was
probably for the purpose of verifying that no psychosis existed. 65 Once
more it must be noted that the New Hampshire doctrine permits the
61. "While capacity to distinguish right from wrong is no longer the earmark
of legal sanity, the lack of that capacity is one of the earmarks of legal insanity."
(Emphasis not supplied.) Wright v. United States, 250 F.2d 4, 12 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
62. I was County Solicitor [of Merrimack County] from 1930 to 1944.
During that period it was my practice to arrange for persons charged with
felonies to be committed to the State Hospital for observation in advance
of trial. I do not remember a case in which a person so committed was ever
found insane by the Superintendent of the State Hospital. The Superintendent
always took the position in these cases that I had to do with that the test for
insanity was whether the person kncw the difference between right and wrong.
Personal Letter From Willoughby Colby, Esquire, to Johm Reid, January 27, 1960.
63. The Laconia (N.H.) Evening Citizen, Dec. 10, 1937, p. 6, col. 7.

64. Ibid.

65. As I recall it, Dr. Dolloff examined Long repeatedly. He found the key
as he believed, in the answer to a series of questions lie asked Long; to this
purpose: Do you ever seek connection with women? Yes. What do you do
when the woman resists? I let her alone. He therefore concluded that the
sexual urge was controllable, hence Long was sane. I think that a number
of the hospital staff at the time disagreed with Dr. Dolloff. I do not know
why, but I have wondered whether to some psychiatrists a psychosis seems
the controlling factor as a matter of course. But that is not our legal rule.
Letter From lon. Elwin L. Page, former Associate Justice, N.H. Supreme Court
to Hon. Amos N. Blandin, Jr., Associate Justice, N. I-. Supreme Court, quoted in a
personal communication from Hon. Amos N. Blandin, Jr., to John Reid, February 25,
1960.
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State Hospital to define "insanity" by whatever means or test it pleases.
Whether or not the test the Hospital uses is correct is a question of fact
for the jury. The difficulty is that few defense counsel appreciated this,
and as a result they accepted the Hospital's report as determinative of
the question of fact. Thus the State Psychiatrists were responsible for
perpetuating in New Hampshire the right-wrong test which the legal
profession had rejected in 1869, partly on the belief that they represented
medical error. 66 Today, however, this is no longer true, for the State
Psychiatrists reach their conclusions on grounds more closely related to the
67
question of fact which the jury would determine if the issue went to trial.
The suggestion that some New Hampshire attorneys have failed to grasp
the full scope of the New Hampshire doctrine is not an idle guess. The records
of a few cases show that defense counsel believed that insanity was
governed by one or more of the tests which are law in other jurisdictions. 8
Thus the State Psychiatrists can hardly be blamed for using the M'Naghten
criteria (assuming they were applying it because they thought it was the
law of New Hampshire and not because they thought it was the correct
medical test); especially when we consider that, as recently as 1957, the
Clerk of Court of one county instructed the Superintendent of the State
Hospital that, under State v. Jones, the test for insanity in New Hampshire
was knowledge of the difference between doing right and wrong, and
whether there was an irresistible impulse.6 9
66. Although the New Hampshire doctrine is fundamentally based on the legal
principle that M'Naghten is an unwarranted presumption which usurps the fact-finding
function of the jury (see Reid, A Speculative Novelty: Judge Doe's Search for Reason
in the Law of Evidence, 39 B.U.L. REv. 321 (1959)), it cannot be denied that
Judge Doe was strongly impressed by the fact that the right-wrong test was considered
by some psychiatrists to be "bad" medicine (see Reik, The Doe-Ray Correspondence:
A Pioneer Collaboration in the Jurisprudence of Mental Disease, 63 YALE L.J. 183
(1953)).
67. [T he question as to the determination of insanity as practiced in cases
in which criminal action is contemplated or in which an indvidual has
committed some crime, is determined in the hospital on the basis of the
New Hampshire Rule which, in essence, is a product rule. Our determination
of the question is based, not upon existence of the fact that the individual
knew the difference between right and wrong (basically the essence of the
M'Naghten Rule), but whether the individual was suffering from some form
of mental illness, disease, or derangement which could account for the
commission of the crime. Ultimately this is a question of fact to be determined
by a jury, if in our opinion, the individual was not found to have any form
of mental illness.
Personal Letter From Harrison M. Baker, M.D., Director of Correctional Psychiatry,
N. H. State Hospital, to John Reid, March 30, 1960.
68. This may be explained, in part, by the fact that New Hampshire is one of
the two jurisdictions in the United States which does not have a law school. All
New Hampshire lawyers are trained outside the state, especially in M'Naghten-bound
Massachusetts.
69. In passing, and without attempting to infringe upon your province, it is
my understanding, after eighteen years as a practicing attorney and eleven years
as Clerk, that the legal yardstick which is applied in these cases is: Did the
respondent know the difference between (doing) right and (doing) wrong
when the action was committed?
In a case State v. Jones, 50 N.H. 369, the Supreme Court found .... 'an
act produced by a mental disease is not a crime; if the defendant, (respondent)
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Some lawyers have not only believed that New Hampshire has a test
for determining insanity, but have acted on that premise. One defense
counsel, who discovered that the State Hospital, which reported his client
to be sane, had overlooked the fact that the man was an epileptic, petitioned
the court for a second examination so that, as he put it, it could be
determined "whether he is inflicted with 'insanity or mental derangement'
within the meaning of Revised Laws, ch. 429, s. 2."70 When the second
report of the State Hospital confirmed that the defendant was "sane,"
the lawyer, apparently believing that the determination had been made
on the basis of some test which defined insanity 72"within the meaning"
71
of the statute, changed his client's plea to guilty.

It is not surprising, therefore, to discover that some judges have
instructed their juries in a way far removed from the New Hampshire
premise that insanity is a question of fact. In one recent case the jury was
even charged in M'Naghten terms.7" The judge did this at the request of
the respondent,7 - despite the fact that the Supreme Court has said such a
request should not be granted. 5 To do so defeats the New Hampshire
doctrine, since it means that insanity is no longer a question of fact but
is limited to the definition which the judge gives it,76 and such a
definition can not be left to the choice of the defendant.
Similarly other judges, while steering clear of concepts such as rightwrong or irresistible impulse, have stressed intent to such a degree that
they have, in effect, instructed the jury that the defendant must not be
found insane unless the mental disease from which he suffers interfered
with his ability to form a criminal intent.77
Finally, as might be expected, there are cases in which counsel and
court have equated the New Hampshire doctrine with the Durham rule.

had a mental disease which irresistibly impelled him to kill and the killing
was the product of mental disease, he is not guilty . ..' In said case,
on a trial for murder, the defense was insanity (at the time of commission
of the alleged crime).
Letter From the Clerk of Court, Merrimack County Superior Court to the Superintendent,
N.H. State Hospital, jan. 29, 1957, filed with the papers in State v. Tenney, Merrimack
State Docket No. 400 (1957).
70. Motion for Recommitment (Emphasis added), State v. Sheeney, Strafford
Criminal Docket No. 2271 (1945).
71. The statute merely recognized insanity as a special, statutory defense separate
from the general issue of not guilty.
72. He was undoubtedly satisfied with the sentence of 23 to 40 years.
73. See the charge in State v. Snow reproduced in Appendix C.
74. Who also asked for the irresistible impulse test, see, Respondent's Requests
for Instructions No. 5, Respondent's Bill of Exceptions, p. 53, State v. Snow, 98
N. H. 1, 93 A.2d 831 (1953).
75. In one case the defendant appealed when the trial judge refused to charge
in M'Naghten-irresistible impulse terms and instead instructed the jury that insanity
was a question of fact. The verdict was upheld. State v. Jones, 50 N.H. 369 (1871).
76. See discussion, Reid, Understanding the New Hampshire Doctrine of Criminal
Insanity, 69 YALE L.J. 367, 414-15 (1960).
77. See the charges reproduced in Appendix C.
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In one trial the defense asked for and the court granted the following
instruction:
"An accused is not criminally responsible if his unlawful act was
the product of mental disease or mental defect." '7 ,
This was lifted word for word from the Durham case.7 9 From a New

Hampshire point of view there is nothing wrong with this charge 0 (since
it leaves to the jury as a question of fact how much causation is required
by the word "product"). The court, however, by adopting Durham
terminology ran into the same trouble which the Durham judges, 8a and
the framers of the Model Penal Code 82 had encountered, and decided it
had to define what it meant by the phrase "mental disease and mental
defect."8' 3 This demonstrates the difficulty which can arise by identifying
New Hampshire with Durham, for the New Hampshire doctrine makes all
matters, including definitions and even choice of words, questions of fact., 4
It would be error for a New Hampshire court to define either "disease"
or "defect" since to do so would be to define "insanity" and under the
New Hampshire doctrine the definition of insanity is a question of fact.
Yet, such an "error" is a natural consequence of confusing New Hampshire
with Durham. So long as this is done the New Hampshire doctrine is
bound to become more and more diluted with the flaws and compromises
which Durham is heir to.
This points up what is the greatest weakness of the New Hampshire
doctrine. It is identified with the Durham rule. Not only have most of the

78.State v. DeMandel, Rockingham State Docket No. 4513 (1959)

(breaking,

entering and larceny).
79. Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862, 875 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
80. The court also ruled (in terms which seem to require that the mental disease
must affect mens rea if the defendant is to be held insane):
No person should be convicted of a criminal charge when at the time of the
act or omission alleged he was suffering from mental disease and by
reason of such mental disease he did not have the particular state of mind that
must accompany such act or omission in order to constitute the crime charged.
State v. DeMandel, Rockingham State Docket No. 4513 (1959).
81. Durham courts have insisted on stressing the distinction between "disease"
and "defects," even suggesting:
The New Hampshire test and that adopted in the Durham case are precisely
the same, except that the Durham case extended it to include mental defects;
whereas the New Hampshire doctrine seems to have been originally limited
to mental diseases.
United States v. Fielding, 148 F. Supp. 46, 51 (D.D.C. 1957).
82. "The terms 'mental disease or defect' do not include an abnormality manifested
only by repeated criminal or otherwise anti-social conduct," MODEL PENAL CODE
4.01 (2) (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955). This definition did not satisfy the Vermont
legislature which added to it the qualification: "The terms 'mental disease or defect'
shall include congenial and traumatic mental conditions as well as disease." VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 13, § 4801(2) (1958).
is given the meaning
83. The Court ruled: "The word 'mental defect' ...
advanced by counsel for the defendant of 'permanent or lasting mental disease."
State v. DeMandel, Rockingham State Docket No. 4513 (1959).
84. See discussion, Reid, Understanding the New Hampshire Doctrine of Criminal
Insanity, 69 YALE L.J. 367, 391-2 (1960).
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leading commentators8" and several of our state courts86 regarded New
Hampshire and Durham as similar, but, as the case just discussed shows,
some New Hampshire judges and lawyers do also. If this continues to
be the trend the New Hampshire doctrine is doomed. For the Durham rule,
with its greater number of reported decisions and the greater prestige which
its "pioneering" court enjoys, will submerge the older doctrine, and New
Hampshire will shift from a rule of law which adheres to the fundamental
legal principle that questions of fact are for the jury to a rule of medicine
which adheres to whichever of the latest advances of science appeal to the

appellate judges.
THE ACHIEVEMENT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

The weaknesses which havo been discussed are outweighed by the
advantages of the New Hampshire doctrine. These advantages, like the
weaknesses, are more inherent in the procedural practice which has grown
up in New Haimpshire rather than in the doctrine itself. Yet practice
can not be wholly separated from doctrine, partly because many of the
procedures and customs which have been developed for dealing with the
criminally insane in New Hampshire may be attributed to the spirit of
cooperation which the New Hampshire doctrine (by abandoning unrealistic
tests) has fostered between the legal and medical profession.

Perhaps the most remarkable achievement of New Hampshire procedure
is that prosecutors in that state have come to regard the verdict of "not
guilty by reason of insanity" as a tool for protecting the public and rehabilitating the wrong-doer rather than as an escape route for criminals. There
is a general acceptance among them that prison is not the best place for
every type of offender and that the law has a duty to prevent future crimes

as well as punish past ones. They regard psychiatrists with less suspicion
than seems to be the rule for prosecutors in other American jurisdictions.
This has been demonstrated in many cases. A typical example involved
a defendant indicted for unnatural acts with a minor, who was before
the court for sentence following a plea of guilty. The issue of "sanity"
was not raised, 87 yet the problem of disposition troubled the authorities.
Asked by the court for a recommendation, the County Solicitor said:

85. See, e.g., Guttmacher, The Psychiatrist as an Expert Witness, 22 U. C111.
L. REv. 325, 327 (1955).
86. For example, one court was asked to adopt the New Hampshire doctrine which
was correctly explained in appellant's brief as making "insanity" a question of fact
for the jury. The court, instead of considering New Hampshire, undertook to discuss
and reject Durham. Commonwealth v. Chester, 337 Mass. 702, 150 N.E. 2d 914
(1958). More recently the Florida Court identified Durham and New Hampshire.
It did so in a case in which it professed to reject the New Hampshire doctrine, but
since it referred to New Hampshire as the irresistible impulse and moral insanity test
the most it can be said to have rejected is an unresearched phantom. Piccott v. State,
116 So.2d 626, 627 (Fla. 1959).
87. The defendant had been committed for observation under New Hampshire's
sexual psychopath statute and had been "found not classifiable as a sexual psychopath."
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It is also difficult for me to know the right recommendation
with someone with this type of tendencies, the involvement with
boys who are still growing, still adolescents, may be misled perhaps
one way or the other. . . .I think any respondent with this kind
of tendency should be supervised, that there should be a deterrent
perhaps over his head so that perhaps it would help him control
his own tendency. I would recommend that rather than any type
of jail sentence that is terminated right away. 8
Whether this "protection-to-the-public" theory is an outgrowth of the
New Hampshire doctrine is open to debate. It is significant that it is shared
by the one other jurisdiction in the English-speaking world which makes
insanity a question of fact, Scotland, 9 and also by the Durham court, 0
while it is rejected by some M'Naghten jurisdictions which continue to
identify the public's protection with the criminal's punishment.91
One reason for the development of the protection-to-the-public theory
in New Hampshire is the fact that the State may, on its own initiative,
raise the issue of insanity.9 2 In perhaps nine out of every ten cases in
88. Transcript of Hearing, State v. Rathburn, Rockingham State Docket No. 4541
(1959).
89. I cannot assent to the contention that the protection of the public isto be
disregarded, nor the implied separation of the panel's [accused's] own
protection from that of the public. . . . The interests of society include
the refoniation of the criminal, the prevention of the repetition of the crime
by him or by others, and the protection of other members of the community.
When a panel [an accused] is convicted of a crime committed under an
impulse which he is less able to resist than the normal person, and when
there is evidence that the impairment of his powers of resistance may come
into play after a long interval during which there have been no premonitary
signs of danger, and when the crime has been one of atrocious ferocity,
the protection of the public against its repetition is especially relevant.
1-. M. Advocate v. Kirkwood, [1939] Just. Cas. 36, 40-41 (Scot.) (this case involved a
plea of diminished responsibility, not insanity, yet the court held that protection of the
public required that the defendant be segregated from society for the rest of his life).
90. If Williams' violent act in 1949 sprang from mental disorder- if,indeed,
he has a mental illness which makes it likely that he will commit other violent
acts when his sentence is served, imprisonment is not a remedy. Not only
would it be wrong to imprison him, but imprisonment would not secure the
community against repetitions of his violence. Hospitalization, on the other
hand, would serve the dual purpose of giving him the treatment required for
his illness and keeping him confined until it would be safe to release him.
Society's great interest in the proper disposition of such cases would be
deserved if the Government, in prosecuting them, adopted an attitude of
passivity or resistence to the production of evidence.
Williams v. United States, 250 F.2d 19, 26 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
91. [T]he question of sexual psychopathy becomes wholly immaterial after
the imposition of sentence involving the death penalty. The nature of the
sentence in such case assures the protection of society from any future
activities of the defendant regardless of whether or not he may be a sexual
psychopath.
People v. McCracken, 39 Cal.2d 336,346, 246 P.2d 913, 919 (1952).
92. "When a person is indicted for any offense, or is committed to jail on any
criminal charge to await the action of the grand jury, any justice of the court before
which he is to be tried, if a plea of insanity is made in court, or said justice is
notified by'either party that there is a question as to the sanity of the respondent,
may . . . order such person into the care and custody of the superintendent of the
state hospital, to be detained and observed by him until further order of the
court .. " N.H. Rr-v. STAT. ANN. § 135:17 (1955).
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which insanity (at the time of the offense as well as present insanity)
is a factor, it is the prosecution which first introduces it. This is done
by moving for pre-trial examination and commitment to the State Hospital.
Whether or not the State may go forward and produce evidence at the
trial to prove insanity over the objections of the defendant has never
been decided in New Hampshire. The statute seems to imply that it may.
The Royal Commission on Capital Punishment which urged that England
adopt an insanity "test" somewhat similar to New Hampshire's, felt that
this was going too far.93 One objection is that if the jury agrees with the
State and finds the defendant insane and the defendant is then committed
indefinitely, he cannot appeal because technically he has been found not
guilty. 4 It is submitted that this offers no problem in New Hampshire
since a State-raised issue of insanity is raised under the special, statutory
defense of insanity which is different in legal consequences from the
defense of insanity raised under the general issue of not guilty. 5 The
Supreme Court, therefore, might hold that a defendant who pleads not
guilty and offers evidence that he is not insane to rebut the State-raised
issue of insanity, yet is found "not guilty by reason of mental derangement"
as provided by the statutory plea, has the same rights of appeal as if he had
been found "guilty."
A more serious objection to allowing the state to introduce the issue
of insanity is that it may jeopardize the defendant's chances of proving
himself not guilty by some other defense. This, of course, would depend
upon the defense.90 The question has never been raised in New Hampshire.
93. Royal Commission on Capital Punishment, Report CMD No. 8932, para. 443
1 1953). The Royal Commission said that "It has . . . been accepted as the law of
ngland that the issue of insanity at the time of the offense may not be raised by the
judge or by the prosecution, but only by the defence." Id. This is not quite true.
See, R. v. Bastian, [1958] 1 All. E. R. 568 (Cent. Crim. Ct.); R. v. Kemp [1956] 3
Weekly L. R. 724, 727 (Bristol Summer Assizes); R. v. Holliday, [1924] So. Afr. L. R.
250, see also the South African cases of R. v. Ngema and Cele, [1960] 1 So. Afr. L. R.
137, 141 (App. Div.) (1959).
94. This is discussed in R. v. Holliday, [1924] So. Afr. 250 (App. Div.) and
in LANSDOWN & VAN DEE RIET, JUDICIAL
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE ACTS 143-4 (1956).

INTERPRETATIONS

OF THE

SOUTH

AFRICAN

95. State v. Forcier, 95 N.H. 341, 63 A.2d 235 (1949); State v. Long, 90 N.H.
103, 106, 4 A.2d 865, 6 A.2d 752 (1939).
96. The wording of the simple principle that insanity is an issue to be raised
by the defence is satisfactory so long as the existence of insanity as a state
of fact is inconsistent or potentially inconsistent with other defences. To raise
the issue of insanity certainly may reduce the force, as factual material for
the jury's consideration, of evidence of, for example, self-defence. But there may,
to argue hypothetically for the present, be other defences which are not
factually inconsistent with the evidence of insanity; defences, that is to say,
capable of being convincingly established by facts which admit of the interpretation 'insanity also.' If such defences exist, and if it is right that the
principle that insanity is an issue to be raised by the defence alone is to be
attributed largely to the fact that there may be another defence in some degree
reduced in force by evidence of insanity, then it becomes apparent that the
principle is perhaps not, for all purposes, correctly worded.
Griew, "Diminished Responsibility" and the Trial of Lunatics Act, 1883, [1957]
CRIM. L. REV. 521, 525.
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Perhaps the most significant factor to be learned from the New
Hampshire approach to criminal insanity (i.e., the protection-to-the-public
attitude combined with the State's power to raise the issue) comes from
a study of cases in which the prosecution has introduced the question of
insanity. Some judges 97 and psychiatrists98 have suggested that insanity
is important only in cases involving capital punishment. The New Hampshire experiment proves that this is not so once the plea of insanity
comes to be recognized as a weapon for the prosecution as well as for
the defense. In most of the cases in which the State has raised the issue
of insanity, the death penalty has not been a factor. 99
A study of the records in only one middle-size county reveals that, in
addition to such capital offenses as homicide, 10 0 uxoricide, 01 and infanticide
by an unwed mother,10 2 the State has raised the issue of insanity in cases
involving arson, 03 robbery and intent to rob,104 aggravated assault, 105
larceny, 08 breaking and entering in the night, 10 7 breaking and entering, 08
and bigamy. 0 9 In other cases the State has petitioned for observation at
97. State v. Lucas, 30 N.J. 37, 82, 87, 152 A.2d 50, 74, 77 (1959) (concurring
opinion).
98. "Abolish capital punishment and the dispute between lawyers and doctors ceases
to be of practical importance." EAST, SOCIETY AND THE CRIMINAL 65 (1951).
99. This was demonstrated by a reply which the Solicitor of Belknap County
sent to Judge Blandin who was conducting a survey on the utility of the New Hampshire
doctrine for Professor Weihofen.
Replying to your letter of November 29, 1954, the question of insanity
has arisen in five felony cases [between Jan. 1, 1953 and Nov, 1, 1954]
and in each case I brought up the question before indictment or before
waiver of indictment.
One of these five is awaiting report, one was found sane and was
released on probation and carved his initials on the breast of a girl he thought
was his girl friend and wasn't (this was done in Mass. so don't get excited),
two were found mentally deranged at the time of the offense and the Grand
Jury, after a vote they should otherwise be indicted, omitted to indict by
reason of mental derangement, and in the other case the defendant was
found to lack sufficient intelligence to be able to defend himself.
Letter From Thomas P. Cheney, Esquire, to Hon. Amos N. Blandin, Jr., quoted
in a Personal Communication from Hon. Amos N. Blandin, Jr., to John Reid,
February 25, 1960.
100. State v. Sheehy, Strafford Criminal Docket No. 2271 (1945).
101. State v. Rankin, Strafford Criminal Docket No. 3230 (1960).
102: State v. Gordon, Strafford Criminal Docket No. 3183 (1959).
103. State v. Merchand, Strafford Criminal Docket No. 2347 (1947). In one arson
case the County Solicitor's motion for commitment for observation read in part - "That
there is a question as to the sanity of the respondent and no doubt a plea of 'not
guilty, by reason of insanity,' will be made by the respondent in case of indictment
by said Grand Jury." State v. Goodwin, Strafford Criminal Docket No. 2027 (1938).
104. State v. Allen, Strafford Criminal Docket No. 2605 (1952).
105. State v. Cahill, Strafford Criminal Docket No. 1868 (1934).
106. State v. Daniel, Strafford Criminal Docket No. 2296 (1945).
107. State v. Smith, Strafford Criminal Docket No. 1843 (1933).
108. State v. Bernard, Strafford Criminal Docket No. 2867 (1957). In this case the
County Solicitor petitioned for examination because the defendant had made several
suicide attempts while in the lock-up. For the Hospital's report that he was sane
see note 55 supra.
109. State v. Moulton, Strafford Criminal Docket No. 1713 (1930).
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the suggestion of the court'1 0 or has joined with the defense in raising
the issue of insanity.'
It would seem, therefore, in view of the fact that New Hampshire
prosecutors not only are willing to introduce the issue of insanity whenever
there is reason to suspect that a defendant is suffering from a mental
disease but also have accepted without challenge the Hospital's deter-

ruination of the defendant's condition, that practice in New Hampshire
long ago reached the level of cooperation between law and medicine which
the Durham judges have been seeking.'' 2 But unlike the District of
Columbia,' 1 3 it reached this level of cooperation without turning the appellate
court into a board of psychiatric experts who decide questions of fact
which, in New Hampshire, properly belong to the jury.' 1 4 It was probably
to this approach the Chief Justice of New Hampshire was referring when
he wrote that the New Hampshire doctrine has brought about results
"which would seem to be more consistent with ordinary wisdom than is
possible under the M'Naghten Rules."' 5
Sometimes the court, the prosecution and defense counsel are anxious
to put more stress on a defendant's mental condition than are the
psychiatrists. This happens in "tough" cases. The New Hampshire doctrine
is flexible and the plea of insanity can occasionally offer an easy way
7
out.,"' (It can also be an effective delaying weapon for the defense.)"
110. State v. Woods, Strafford Criminal Docket No. 2912 (1956)

(breaking and

entering).
111. State v. Morgan, Strafford Criminal Docket No. 435 (1907) (murder). This is
the only case of those mentioned in this paragraph in which the defendant was found
to be insane by the Hospital.
112. "The Durham opinion removes a long-existing barrier to communication between
lawyers and physicians." Roche, Criminality and Mental Illness- Two Faces of the
Same Coin, 22 U. Cni. L. REV. 320, 324 (1955).
113. For evidence that the Durham court has not been successful in creating an
atmosphere such as exists in New Hampshire, at least among prosecutors, see Gasch,
Prosecution Problems Under the Durham Rule, 5 CATHOLIC LAW. 5 (1959).
114. Reid, Understanding the New Hampshire Doctrine of Criminal Insanity,
69 YALE L.J. 367, 389-91 (1960).
115. Letter From lion. Frank R. Kenison to Hon. J. C. McRuer, Chief Justice
of the High Court of Ontario, May 2, 1955, copy on file at New Hampshire
Supreme Court.
116. I recalled an experience I had [while County Solicitor] probably
twenty-five years ago in which an elderly woman got mad at the man she
kept house for and put some cyanide of potassium in his coffee. She was
subsequently indicted for first degree murder. When her case came up the
Court accepted a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity and ordered her
committed to the State Hospital until she was discharged by the Court. Actually, in my opinion, the Court thought she would not live very long
and that all things considered that was the best way to dispose of the case in fact she did not live but a few years.
Personal Communication From Willoughby A. Colby, Esquire, to John Reid, January 27,
1960.

117. In the Forcier case [95 N.H. 341, 63 A.2d 235 (1949)], we knew that

our client was not insane, but at the time he was indicted and arraigned,
there was very bad feeling in the community. We were pleased to have the
opportunity to go up to the Supreme Court on the issues raised by the
peculiar plea that was entered, so that the hot heads in the area would have
time to cool off. This is a practical situation that I find to be effective.
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Thus in the case set forth in Appendix D the court, with the active support
of the County Solicitor and the defense, forced the State Hospital to
accept a patient it did not want. It would be difficult to say that in the
few times this happens it does not serve the ends of justice or protect
the public.
In summing up the achievements of the New Hampshire doctrine
it is necessary to note that though the State has shown remarkable
willingness to raise the issue of insanity, it does so only in a small minority
of cases where the facts warrant it;1 1 8 that Attorneys General in New
Hampshire are as prosecution-minded as those in other states and must
be convinced that the mental illness is a genuine factor in a case before they
will follow the "approach" which has been referred to;" 9 and that courts
require that psychiatric evidence bear on the issue of responsibility as well
as rehabilitation. 20 They insist that there be a balance between law and
medicine. This is the achievement of New Hampshire. For by rejecting the
M'Naghten attempt to subordinate medicine to law and the Durham
attempt to subordinate law to medicine, the New Hampshire doctrine has
Time is a great healer of wounds. This proved so in the Forcier case, because
after all the hearings had been concluded and the Supreme Court had ruled,
we came back to the Superior Court and entered a plea of guilty and Forcier
was not given a terribly severe sentence, but actually a moderate one.
We had used private psychiatrists in this case for the purpose of rebutting
some of the opinions which appeared in the report of the psychiatrists at
the State Hospital, for the purpose of showing the Court, on the question of
sentence, after we entered a plea of guilty, that Forcier was in need of help,
particularly psychiatric help, which would enable him to straighten out his
problems and become a useful and valuable citizen, and that a long stay in
the State Hospital was not the solution. As I mentioned earlier, Forcier
definitely was not insane. We knew it, the State knew it, and the Court
was aware of that fact as well.
Personal Communication From Robert Shaw, Esquire, to John Reid, February 17, 1960.
118. The State does not even petition for psychiatric observation in all murder
cases. See State v. Congdon, Strafford Criminal Docket No. 1660 (1928); State v.
Mevitgs, Strafford Criminal Docket No. 1179 (1919).
119. Thus in a recent case the Attorney General, while he was willing to accept
a plea of second degree from an uxoricide and less than life imprisonment, nevertheless
would not agree that psychiatric evidence called for a sentence of from five to ten years.
This led defense counsel to comment that the Attorney General, who was on vacation,
was unfamiliar with the facts and was "controlling this case from the beaches of
Sunny Florida." Manchester (N.H.) Union Leader. March 25, 1960, p. 11, col. 5.
120. At a hearing to determine sentence of a defendant who had pleaded guilty
of second degree murder, the Chief Justice of the Superior Court, after listening to
psychiatric evidence offered in mitigation of sentence, observed:
It was quite interesting to hear the testimony of the psychiatrist, and the
Court was impressed. However, the testimony simply relates to the rehabilitation of an individual who may be mentally disturbed. It did not, apparently,
and has not taken into consideration that a man who killed somebody has
to be punished. It would be indicated from the testimony that the person
had no mental disturbance and was completely all right, that he is free to be
let loose, which, of course, would not be the infliction of any punishment.
So, having in mind that the Respondent may need some treatment and may
some day be safe to be let at large, he still must be punished, regardless of
his mental condition at the moment, for the crime, and that has not been
touched upon at all by the psychiatrist.
Transcript of Rearraignment Hearing, pp. 24-5, March 24, 1960, State v. Rankin,
Strafford Criminal Docket No. 3230 (1960).
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made law and medicine working partners in the quest for justice in the
shadow land of legal responsibility.
TE LESSON OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

12 1

If there is any conclusion which can be drawn from this survey, it
is that the suggestion the New Hampshire doctrine is a dormant legal
principle (sometimes implied from the fact that it has not been appealed
since first formulated), 22 is wrong. The New Hampshire insanity doctrine
has not only led a very active life, it has been creative. It has suscitated an
"approach" to the problem of criminal insanity which contains lessons for
other, more conceptual-minded jurisdictions.
Admittedly there have not been enough cases from which to draw
positive conclusions concerning the reaction of juries to the New Hampshire
doctrine.' 23 There have, however, been enough pre-trial commitments for
observation to the State Hospital to show that psychiatrists (at least those
in New Hampshire), when asked their opinion on the question of fact,
do not confuse criminal responsibility with mere mental disturbance. As
actual cases demonstrate, they have sometimes been more conservative
121. These conclusions are not trammeled by the fact that this survey has, to a large
extent, been limited to one county. Strafford is a typical county and since the nisi prius
judges in New Hampshire ride the circuit and take turns presiding in each of the ten
counties, what is done in Strafford is representative of the entire state.
122. "So far as the insanity defense is concerned, there has not been a reported
case since the two cases in which the 'New Hampshire rule' was established in 1869
and 1871." Weihofen, The Flowering of New Hampshire, 22 U. Cm. L. REV. 356, 357
1955). This is not quite true. There have been at least five cases appealed to the
upreme Court in which "the insanity defense" was a factor in the trial court.
State v. Snow, 98 N.H. 1 (1953); State v. Johnson, 96 N.H. 4, 69 A.2d 525 (1949);
State v. Forcier, 95 N.H. 341, 63 A.2d 235 (1949); State v. Long, 90 N.H. 103,
4 A.2d 865, 6 A.2d 752 (1939); State v. Hause, 82 N.H. 133, 130 Atl. 743 (1925).
Professor Weihofen is correct, however, when he says that "No criminal case involving
the rule governing mental irresponsibility has been appealed to the State Supreme Court
since 1871." WEIHOFEN, THE URGE TO PUNISH 134 (1956).

This can be explained,

not by the fact the doctrine has been dormant, but because, ever since the Pike case
jettisoned the M'Naghten and irresistible impulse tests and the Jones case ruled that
a New Hampshire defendant was not entitled to a specific "test," there have been no
grounds for appeal. In the cases where the trial court either misinterpreted the doctrine or
instructed in terms of one of the old tests, failure to appeal was undoubtedly due to
the fact that counsel did not appreciate the full scope of the doctrine or believed the
old test was still law. Thus in a 1952 case the defense not only failed to appeal a
M'Naghten instructions (See Appendix C) but in its brief told the Supreme Court"The test of responsibility for crime, where the offense [sic] of insanity is set up,
is the power or capacity of the defendant to distinguish between right and wrong in
reference to the particular act in question." Brief for Defendant, p. 9, State v. Snow,
98 N.H. 1, 93 A.2d 831 (1953).
123. Of course it could be said, as some have argued, that New Hampshire juries
reach the same verdicts as M'Naghten juries since they all apply the New Hampshire
doctrine.
No matter how the jury is charged, the way they actually approach the question
in the jury room is probably pretty much in accord with the New Hampshire
rule. They may not articulate it precisely, but if they are convinced that the
defendant really was seriously disordered, and that it was this fact that led
to the crime, they will usually acquit.
XVEIHOFEN, THE URGE TO PUNISH 47 (1955).
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than lawyers. 124 Because of the procedure followed in New Hampshire, this
determination made by the psychiatrists at the pre-trial stage is the true
key to the working of the doctrine. Since almost all insanity pleas are
disposed of at this time, it is here that the.doctrine's full impact is felt.
For psychiatrists are able to examine the accused in accordance with
medical concepts, and need not limit themselves to the sole question of
whether he knew that what he was doing was wrong. Their determination
as to his responsibility can be accepted or rejected by the defense or the
State (and, if rejected by either side and the matter goes to trial, by the
jury); but the significant factor is that the diagnosis of his "medical
condition" can be formulated unhampered by tests designed to describe
his "legal condition." The decision as to his criminal accountability is a
separate step and is made in the light of the medical report by the lawyers
or, if they fail to agree, by the jury. They, too, are free from the meshes
of outmoded tests and can base their decision on the individual himself,
rather than on what he knows. The problem is usually resolved by a
consideration of where he belongs (both for his benefit and the benefit of
the community) and not what he has done. This is the perspicacity of
the New Hampshire doctrine. In the few cases which get to trial the
judges have often stumbled in their instructions to the jury and have failed
to present the issue as a pure question of fact. In the vast majority of
cases, however, the matter has been resolved short of trial, and the decision
arrived at by defense and prosecution has been based on the facts established
by untrammeled psychiatrists. It is at this stage that the success of the
New Hampshire doctrine is to be found.
Like Scotland, which also makes responsibility a question of fact1 25
(but unlike Durham), 126 the New Hampshire doctrine has not yet been
124. See Appendix D, also note 135 infra.
125. For a description of Scottish practice see the testimony of the Lord Justice in
Ordinary, Lord Keith of Avonholm in, Royal Commission on Capital Punishment,
Minutes of Evidence, Eighteenth Day, Tuesday, April 4, 1950, p. 419, paras. 5216-20.

126. Originally the government psychiatrists in the District of Columbia viewed

psychopaths and insanity in the same manner the New Hampshire State Hospital did.
The Assistant Superintendent of St. Elizabeths announced that psychopathic personalities
should not be regarded as having a "mental disease" for purposes of the Durham rule.
Unlike the New Hampshire Supreme Court in State v. Long, however, the Durham
court did not feel that the correctness of this opinion by the government psychiatrists
was a question of fact for the jury. Rather, as Judge Bazelon phit it, "This inevitably
encroaches upon the jury function." Briscoe v. United States, 248 F.2d 640,
644 n. 6 (D.C. Cir. 1957) (dictum). Just how this encroaches on the jury function

is not clear unless the Court felt the government psychiatrists should express no
opinion, one way or the other, oil tile issue whether psychopathy is a "mental disease."
That the Court did not mean this is demonstrated by a recent case which reversed
a conviction based on such evidence, because St. Elizabeths had, since the conviction,
reversed its opinion and had announced that henceforth psychopaths would be
certified as insane. The Court now felt that the official opinion of the Hospital
was entitled to great weight. Blocker v. United States, 274 F.2d 572 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
These

cases point up

the fundamental

distinction

between

New

Hampshire

and

Durham. Under the New Hampshire doctrine the correctness of expert opinion is a
question of fact for the jury and it does not matter whether this opinion coincides
with

the psychiatric

theories of the appellate court. As Judge Doe said,

"whether
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interpreted to cover psychopaths. There is no reason why, in the proper
situation, it could not. 12 7 Whether psychopathy is a "mental disease"
within the meaning of the doctrine is a question of fact for the jury. It is
not for the courts or hospitals to say whether it is or is not. This is one
128
of the strong points of the doctrine - it is not tied to psychiatric concepts.
Nor is it tied to legal truisms. As a result, New Hampshire has been able
to break away from the notion that the insanity defense belongs primarily
in capital cases. It has even spurred the State to discard the traditional
view that insanity is an escape hatch and to adopt (and actively pursue)
the policy that a finding of insanity may be as beneficial to the community
as to the accused.
Perhaps the chief lesson of New Hampshire is this protection-to-thepublic approach which is an accidental result and not an indigenous part
of the doctrine. By restoring the matter of criminal responsibility to the
jury as a question of fact, it has had the undesigned, but fortunate effect,
of ending what Justice Frankfurter has called the "conflict between law
and medicine. ' ' "9 In the atmosphere of greater cooperation which has
resulted, the State has come to regard psychiatry as a partner in its
attempt to protect the public from potentially dangerous wrong-doers, be
they murderers or felons. This, in turn, has had the incidental effect of
making the entire debate over M'Naghten versus Durham seem less important
from a New Hampshire point of view, since it has led to placing great
stress on settling the issue before, rather than during, trial. That this
cannot be entirely separated from the doctrine's main thesis (i.e., that
insanity is a question of fact), is highlighted by practice in Scotland which

or not a medical theory is correct is a question of fact. It is not for the court to say
if any medical theory is correct. Whether the old or the new medical theories

are correct, is a question of fact for the jury; it is not the business of the court
to know whether any of them are correct. The law
State v. Pike, 49 N.H. 399,
advance of science.
opinion).
. 127. Opinion may be swinging in that direction
testimony of Dr. C. D. Bruce, Medical Superintendent,

does not change with every
408, 438 (1869) (concurring
in Scotland as seen by the
Criminal Lunatic Department

(Scotland) who was asked if the concept of diminished responsibility ought to apply to
psychopaths.
It could. Vhcther it ought or not, I am not quite sure yet. Ve do not
know the whole extent of the psychopathic problem yct. Further study of it
I think
may invoke much greater fields of clinical psyciatry than we know. ...
it ought to include some of the less defined types. On the other hand the

grosser form comes in the realm of certification of lunacy lie., insanity].
Later he was asked if it was desirable or justifiable to consider psychopaths as
certifiable lunatics. "Yes, I do. Even Dr. Hopwood, who objects to their presence
in Broadmoor, admitted that too, if you remember." Royal Commission on Capital
Punishment, Minutes of Evidence, 20th day, April 6, 1950, pp. 453-4, paras.
6075-6, 6095.
128. This raises the question why (if in New Hampshire the State is permitted to
raise the issue of insanity and the jury is not barred from considering any mental
illness in deciding the question of fact) New Hampshire needs a Sexual Psychopath
Statute.
129. Letter From Mr. Justice Frankfurter to Sir William J. Haley, Nov. 3, 1952,
in Note, The Real Mhicneachdain, 74 L. Q. REV. 321 (1958).
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settles most of its cases by pleas in bar. 130 New Hampshire defense counsel

as well as prosecutors have taken the attitude that the Hospital's report
should usually decide the issue . 31 This mutual trust between law and
medicine is, of course, far from perfect,

32

yet it is doubtful if there is any

American jurisdiction in which there is better cooperation between the two
33
professions than New Hampshire.
130. For a description of Scots practice see the testimony of the Crown Agent,
Royal Commission on Capital Punishment, Minutes of Evidence, Seventh day,
Thursday, Nov. 3, 1949, p. 177, paras. 1983-5 and p. 178, paras. 1993-5. Also,
testimony of the Vice Dean of the Faculty of Advocates, Id. Nineteenth day, April 5,
1950, p. 453, paras. 5695-97. As in New Hampshire, the plea of insanity has been
rare, partly because most Scottish cases are determined by the pre-trial psychiatric
examination. Smith, Diminished Responsibility, [1957] CRIM. L. REV. 354, 355.
The public policy behind the plea in bar was discussed in Russell v. H. M. Advocate,
[1946] Scots. L.T.R. 93. In 1927 the Lord Constable said: "I cannot but think
that in such cases it would be more desirable that the determination of the question
whether the accused is insane and was insane at the date when the crime was
committed should be left to the jury. But the course of practice has been that, when
a plea of this kind is tabled in bar, the judge should hear the evidence in support
of it which is tendered by the accused, and should pronounce judgment thereon."
H. M. Advocate v. Sharp, [1927] Just. Cas. 66, 67 (Scot.). So confident are the
Scots of this practice that Lord Russell told a jury:
Observe this: the accused is perfectly sane and fit to plead. There is no
question about his sanity. If the accused were insane or were said to be
insane, he would never be tried on a charge. There would be an inquiry
before a Judge, and if found insane, he would be ordered to be detained
during His Majesty's pleasure ...
Carraher v. H. M. Advocate, [1946] Just. Cas. 108, 110 (Scot.). Also as in
New Hampshire, the prosecution is permitted to raise the issue of insanity, at least
as to competency to enter a plea. WALKER & STEVENSON, MACDONALD ON TUE CRIMXIINAL
LAW OF SCOTLAND 271 (5th ed. 1948) and cases cited. But see H. M. Advocate v.

Brown, 5 Adam 312, 321-2 (Scot. 1907). Testimony taken before the Royal
Commission implied that the prosecution can even raise insanity as a plea in defence.
Royal Commission on Capital Punishment, Minutes of Evidence, Eighteenth Day,
Tuesday, April 4, 1950, p. 420, paras. 5233-37.
131. New Hampshire usually follows a different practice than most jurisdictions.
The issue is usually not settled by a hearing following a plea of incompetency to stand
trial. Rather the Grand Jury, after the County Solicitor has informed it of the State
Hospital's determination that the accused is insane, notifies the court that it has
refused to indict by reason of insanity. The accused is then committed.
132. It may be a commentary, however, that what little criticism is aired in
public by New Hampshire lawyers is aimed, not at the inability of psychiatry to
effect the cures claimed by it, but at the failure of some psychiatrists to attempt
those cures. Thus an attorney defending a man indicted for first degree murder
told reporters:
My disgust is with the New Hampshire State Hospital where Mr. Rankin
had voluntarily submitted himself as a patient a year before be committed
this crime and was found to be mentally ill and yet was released while still
suffering from his mental condition; had he been confined there until his
mental difficulties had been cured, Mrs. Jeannette Rankin might well be
alive today and my client, Herbert Rankin, would now be a free and
mentally healthy citizen.
Foster's Daily Democrat (Dover, N.H.), March 24, 1960, p. 3, col. 3.
133. Psychiatrists have sometimes succeeded in toning down the "battle of the
experts" in New Hampshire. Consider the following request by one defense alienist
who believed the State Hospital bad overlooked a significant fact in its diagnosis.
(Defense counsel agreed to the suggestion.)
I have the greatest respect for Dr. Dolloff's judgment, and do not relish
the idea of contradictory or controversial psychiatric testimony in a murder
trial (or in any other trial for that matter). Contradictory testimony by
experts makes big headlines in the newspapers and is responsible for a great
deal of the ridicule to which psychiatrists are subject. I would prefer, if it
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The final conclusion that may be drawn from this survey is that the
working of the New Hampshire doctrine depends upon the procedure
devised to implement it. Neither the protection-of-the-public approach, nor
the full utilization of the doctrine as a defense, can be completely developed
if the question of whom the public should be protected from and who
is insane is left to the unchallenged determination of the State Hospital.
Yet this is what usually happens in New Hampshire. To correct this the
judiciary and the bar must cease to be rubber stamps and assume a more
active role in the determination and disposition of these cases, not only to
see that the law is administered in as uniform a manner as possible, but
also to avoid the pitfalls inherent to any legal system which leaves questions
of fact to the experts. Some of these pitfalls have cropped up under
present New Hampshire practices. For one thing, State psychiatrists have
occasionally limited the issue in a manner not required by the doctrine;
as for example, when they base their findings on causation.13 4 Secondly,
the State Hospital, like most psychiatric institutions, is overcrowded and,
as a result, the State psychiatrists (who, as medical men, are primarily
interested in therapy and are reluctant to fill beds with incurables) have
sometimes avoided certifying immedicable defendants "insane" even when

they consider them dangerous due to mental illness. 35 Finally, the reports
becomes necessary, to have a conference with Dr. Dolloff or to reexamine
this boy in company with him than to have the question of epilepsy sprung
on him on the witness stand, and I know Dr. Dolloff would prefer it.
Letter From Miner H. A. Evans, M.D., to William H. Sleeper, Esquire, February 20,
1945. State v. Sheehy, Strafford Criminal Docket No. 2271 (1945).
134. "Examination reveals that the patient does not have a disease affecting her
mind which would result in the acts which led to her arrest." Medical Report in
State v. Gordon, Strafford Criminal Docket No. 3183 (1959). "Examination reveals
that the patient does not have a disease affecting his mind which would result
in the acts which led to his arrest." Medical Report in State v. Trefethen, Rockingham
State Docket No. 4512 (1959). See also notes 55, 57 supra for a similar report
in State v. Bernard, Strafford Criminal Docket No. 2867 (1957).
135. Consider the case of a twenty-six year old man indicted for fellatio. He
pleaded not guilty by reason of insanity and was committed for observation. The
State Hospital reported that it had ". . . formed the opinion that he is sane, but
is suffering from a condition diagnosed as psychopathic personality with pathologic
sexuality." In reply to an inquiry from the Office of the Attorney General the
Superintendent of the State Hospital wrote:
Dr. Howard felt that the patient probably was the aggressor in the sexual
relationship, and that due to the aggressive characteristics in his personality
it was improbable that he would respond to psychotherapy. Dr. Howard feels
for the same reasons that there is a possihility that this individual may
becone a danger to society.
"I have no reason to doubt that Dr. I-oward's evaluation of this problem is
a correct one, and that the patient would be unlikely to be assisted by psychotherapy
in the State Hospital." Letter From John L. Smalldon, Superintendent, to William
S. Green, Assistant Attorney General, February 16, 1949 (Emphasis added).
The State then decided not to pursue the matter any further. "The letter seems
to me to leave no alternative except to commit Forcier to prison." Letter From
William S. Green, Assistant Attorney General, to Robert Shaw, Esquire, February 21,
1949, State v. Forcier, Strafford Criminal Docket No. 2398 (1949) (for a different
interpretation of this case by defense counsel see note 117 supra.)
This does not occur in every case, of course. One defendant charged with
attempted murder was reported "dangerous to be at large," presently insane, to have
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of the State Hospital are so perfunctory that the Court, the State, and
the defense cannot be sure what they are being asked to endorse. 136 These
defects would not exist in jurisdictions adopting the New Hampshire doctrine
which require detailed psychiatric reports.1 37 For in those states defense
counsel could not only ascertain whether the psychiatrists were applying
a stricter test than necessary, but also whether they were approaching the

problem from a conceptual viewpoint by equating criminal insanity with
psychiatric terms like psychosis. And the prosecution would be better able
to use the doctrine to implement a policy of protecting the public if it
knew that incurables were being certified as sane even though dangerous
by reason of mental illness, and if, in the case of a pyromaniac or a
kleptomaniac, it knew just how irresistible the impulse was, just how the

doctors felt the compulsion would respond to therapy, and just how
repetitive the offender was likely to be.
Despite these defects (which are attributable to procedure practiced in
New Hampshire and not to the doctrine itself), it can be said that the
New Hampshire doctrine has worked successfully in the one jurisdiction
in which it is law. That contrary to the fears of some commentators that
it would prove an escape hatch for criminals, it has primarily been utilized
by prosecutors seeking to segregate mentally ill offenders. If the New
Hampshire doctrine has any inherent weakness, it is that it is misunderstood.
Psychiatrists have missed its implications; defense counsel have not appreciated its full scope,' 38 and at least one court has confused it with
M'Naghten. Worst of all another court equated it with Durham. If such
been insane at the time of the act and to be incurable ("...the prospects for any
marked improvement, even under intensive treatment, are very remote.") State v.
Zela, Merrimack State Docket No. 351 (1958).
136. The full text of one report reads: "I find that through an oversight a report
on Raymond Goodwin, Jr. was never sent in. I wish now to report that I have
formed the opinion that he is insane." State v. Goodwin, Strafford Criminal Docket
No. 2027 (1938).
137. The hospital authorities in some of these states [i.e., those with statutes
providing for pre-trial observation] have not hesitated in their reports, to
go beyond a merely formal finding of 'sane' or 'insane.' and to make specific
diagnoses, such as dementia praecox, cerebral arteriosclerosis, mental deficiency,
etc., and also to make recommendations for the proper treatment or disposition
of the defendant.
Weihofen, Eliminating the Battle of Experts in Criminal Insanity Cases, 48 MicH. L. REV.
961, 970 (1950).

138. Of course, many defense counsel have refused to test the full limits of

the New Hampshire doctrine and have entered a plea of guilty to a lesser charge
rather than press the insanity defense because, if found insane, their client might
be committed to the Hospital for a longer.period of time than if sent to prison.
Consider the statement released to the press by one attorney, explaining why he
had withdrawn the plea of not guilty of first degree murder by reason of insanity
and had pleaded guilty to second degree.
This decision was made in the light of the fact that the sentence for first
degree murder could be life in prison, or even the death sentence and even
if the plea of guilty [sic] by reason of insanity had been accepted, the
sentence would have been life confinement in the New Hampshire State
Hospital. It was, therefore, in the light of other sentences in similar circumstances
that we deemed it best to plead guilty to second degree murder."
Foster's Daily Democrat (Dover, N.H.), March 24, 1960, p. 3, col. 3 (Emphasis added).
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is to be the trend of the law, the future of the New Hampshire doctrine
does not appear bright. Once judges undertake to define words in the
manner of Durham then insanity is no longer a pure question of fact and
New Hampshire has been irrevocably changed. Yet such will undoubtedly
result from any official linkage since the New Hampshire doctrine is bound
to be nubilated by the greater prestige which the District of Columbia
circuit enjoys. This is unfortunate, because New Hampshire has all the
merits of Durham - but few of its faults.
APPENDIX A
Transcript of Hospital Staff Meeting in the Long case
There is perhaps no aspect of equating legal responsibility with
medical responsibility which worries lawyers more than the possibility that
therapy-minded psychiatrists will disregard the problems of public policy.
It is of interest, therefore, to consider the staff meeting of the New
Hampshire State Hospital held to determine whether Howard Long should
be reported as sane or insane. The discussion ranges from Long's medical
condition to the problem of community safety. It is not clear whether
the "they" and the "them" the good doctors continually refer to are the
prospective jurors, the judges, or those rascals-the lawyers.
Participating are Staff psychiatrists and psychologists.
His emotional responses are greatly impaired and there is manneristic
and impulsive escape for them indicating a degree of disintegration and
splitting. He has obviously been a neurotic character from early childhood
and I believe there are enough evidences of disintegration to warrant a
diagnosis of schizophrenia, simple type, being made. He cannot logically
be held responsible for his acts.
Dr. Gau: I'm sorry I cannot agree with all that. To me he is just
another psychopathic personality, markedly so. I think he could answer
much different than he does. I think he is shrewd and following a
definite pattern in his answers.
Dr. Gal: If you talked to him for an hour and still said he was shrewd Dr. Gau: Shrewd enough to have gotten along fairly well - what was
he doing up there - having a little business and getting along pretty good.
Dr. Gal: For a while -fair. He had an income from his stepfather
so he did not have to be too shrewd in his business and could get along
without money in the business. In fact he got into several difficulties
because he did not pay his bills for painting his store. He called in the
executor of the estate to pay the bills.
Dr. Gau: That also speaks for psychopathic -thinks he can get away
with things the average individual has to do-paying bills, leading a
straight life. He thinks he can do the contrary and get away with it.
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He got away with it many times. I fail to see any evidence of an out and
out psychosis. I agree it is a character neurosis but what else can you call
it besides psychopathic personality - and if there isn't any evidence of
psychosis you have to face that and call him not insane and let him face
punishment for his crime.

Dr. Wells: I am inadequate to discuss the case but I think a lot of
his action would go along with a low intellect. Whether a man of this
type of character neurosis - whether he would get over sexual drives and
be a normal person- it is what I'd like answered. He might go along
to a certain age and develop a change of life or something and that's all
there is to it - or whether they continue along that line.
Dr. Gal: You can't let him go along indefinitely killing children.
Dr. W: If he had sodomy and was satisfied - he evidently got along
with it for some time and then had to take it up again and had the drive.
Dr. D: Is there any record from the prison?
Dr. Gal: Yes, but we don't have much. Most of it is repeating what
the Boston Psychopathic said. Shall I read it?
Dr. D: Yes.
Dr. H: He has a definitely inadequate personality and it seems the
continued acts he has had and his psychological tests seem sufficient to
put him in the schizophrenic group.
Dr. J: He is on the borderline to me. It is a difficult case. As you
formulated it he is either a psychopathic personality with strong schizophrenic traits or a simple praecox. I really think it is more or less a
toss-up. A strong case could be built up for either side, I think.
Dr. B: It is very hard to tell whether he should go in the schizophrenic
group or psychopathic. To me the most abnormal thing is his unusual
fatalistic attitude - everything is predestined and you cannot help it.
If you drive fast you just got to drive fast and if you assault and
murder children, it is predestination. He apparently realizes that his conduct
is considered asocial by the majority of people but yet he feels he just
cannot avoid doing it. Whether that makes him definitely psychotic I can't
say. I'd be inclined to call him a simple praecox in a psychopathic individual.
I think he has always been psychopathic and perhaps has gone beyond
the limits of even psychopathic now. He is a very dangerous man in the
community and I think they made a serious mistake when he was let
out in Mass.
Dr. D: What was the basis of letting him out?
Dr. Gal: judge Stone was executor of the estate. As far as I know,
good behavior. Judge Stone was executor of the estate and made application
for his release and a judge- I've forgotten his name- signed the order
for release and he was put on parole for a year.
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Dr. D: He must have had some recommendation from the institution.
Dr. Gal: There is nothing in the record to indicate it. They put it
all -on the court. They said he was ordered released by the court.
Dr. B: It seems from the psychiatric and psychological standpoints
these people who have had perversions with children repeat the offense
if they have the opportunity and that is where the danger lies. If he is
called psychotic he should be in an institution always.
Miss R: The psychiatrists did not want him to go out but the judge
was anxious to get him out.
Dr. 0: I think he is a very sick man and although he does not know
it, I think his attitude is somewhat right. He can't possibly be held
responsible for his early conditioning and inadequate development of
personality. I don't think just because his anti-social acts are of a sexual
nature that it necessarily means he has to be labeled a psychopathic.
I think the whole personality picture is more of a simple schizophrenic.
Of course because there isn't anything that can be done with him it
does not make any difference whether he goes to prison or stays here.
Do you think there is a possibility of his becoming suicidal?
Dr. Gal: I think there is a possibility of his murdering an attendant.
His aggression has never been directed against himself but it has been
explosive manifestations against someone else.
Dr. 0: He is always going to be a dangerous man to handle.
*Dr. F: I usually prefer to emphasize the constitutional factors rather
than conditioning. Both are prominent. I think his fatalistic attitude is one
of the most important features here. It is very noteworthy. He is using
it presumably to cover up his ideas of inadequacy. He is trying to explain,
excuse and forgive on that basis. It would be interesting to learn when
he developed that attitude and what the circumstances were. I am almost
a believer in lack of free will. There is much to be said for it. After all,
we all have certain characteristics that make us do certain things. I may
be a fast driver because I have those characteristics and someone else may
be a cautious one because of the same characteristics. To a certain extent
that is lack.of free will. It is a very broad subject but there is something
to be said.
Dr. 0: Don't you think he says iA because of his fundamentally
passive nature?
Dr. F: To explain his inadequacy and excuse these things he has
been doing. I definitely agree he is a dangerous element.
Dr. Ranger: Without psychosis, psychopathic personality, emotional
immaturity - pathological sexuality.
Dr. D: I am so emotionally upset by the unanimity of opinion that
the man is insane that I am thrown off balance and don't know what to
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do. I wonder if my judgment is defective. I can't see it in the same light
you do.
Dr. F: You have the concept of the court in mind too.
Dr. D: As psychiatrists we have to have some reconciliation with the
courts and if I think a man is insane regardless of what the court thinks
I will so state. Question of whether he should be kept here or in prison
is another question. I could say he was insane and the court could give
him a life sentence in prison without any difficulty. The fact we say he is
insane does not mean he has to come here. It has been done before.
I reported a case once before as insane and the judge didn't pay any
attention to it and sent the man to state prison. Another case I sent in
the woman was not insane and the judge decided she was and sent her
here, so the court reserves its own opinion regardless of any idea of the
psychiatrists. As a rule they are satisfied to take our opinion and in the
great majority we turn them back as not insane. This is a very outstanding
case that will cause a lot of feeling in the way it is handled by the court.
That is not really our problem either. Looking at the case purely as
psychiatrists I feel about it the way Dr. Ranger does. I think his diagnosis
fitted in with my mental conception of such cases. I don't take a lot of
stock in what he says about everything being so predestined. I think if
I discussed it with him more at length I think I could shake him down.
When you put him in a corner with a bit of logic he runs to cover saying
he does not understand which helps him out. How many accidents did
he get into driving his car?
Dr. Gal: Five.
Dr. D: Were they serious?
Dr. Gal: Yes.
Dr. D: I wonder how they kept allowing him to drive?
Dr. Gal: He did have his license revoked for drunken driving. After
he got out of the army it was renewed.
Dr. D: Did he injure anyone?
Dr. Gal: One woman very severely but most of it was smashing his
car. He ran her down.
Dr. D: Does he admit he intended to kill these children?
Dr. Gal: No.
Dr. D: It was just an aftermath

-being

frustrated?

Dr. Gal: The first one of the children jumped out of the car.
Dr. D: There was some question whether it was an accident, wasn't
there? The few times I have seen him he does not present the picture of
praecox. I think he is more emotionally upset over this than he admits.
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It has been my experience that praecoxes are not quite so aggressive and
murderous as he is.
Dr. F: Would he be held in first degree?
Dr. D: Yes. They will charge him with the most serious type and
then- if they make it any less and if it should develop that he did it
with malice aforethought they could not give him the extreme penalty.
They can start at the top and work down but not at the bottom and work
up. I feel he is a psychopath and strongly sexed - and undoubtedly of limited
mentality. The psychologist says he is definitely deteriorated.
Miss R: Definitely inefficient -4.4.
Dr. D: What does that mean?
Miss R: I'd not go so far as to say the inefficiency was permanent,
which is what deterioration implies.
Dr. Gal: There are many evidences of psychiatric deterioration which
I have enumerated.
Dr. Gau: Did he seem to try to answer questions?
Miss R: He cooperated very well.
Dr. J: Could you consider that the murder of these people was a
homosexual panic to a psychotic degree?
Dr. Gal: I don't know. I hadn't thought of it in that way. I can't
think of any reason for thinking so.
Dr. B: Are they the result of frustration?
Dr. Gal: Aggressive to a psychotic degree.
Dr. Ra: I think our analytical study gives conscious and unconscious
motives but it does not remove the fact he did these things and socially
it is important. I don't care why a fellow throws a stone at me but what
is important is that he did it. I think people should be judged by what
they do and not by how they rationalize.
Dr. F: What chance do you think he has of getting off with less
than life? We have to consider that.
Dr. D: He can't get out of it for less than life. If they agree he
is insane they could send him down here. I doubt if they would send
him here. If I said he was insane they would probably send him to jail
anyway. The question of punishment does not enter here. It is as much
punishment for him to be sent to PIA for life as to prison for life,
as far as punishment goes.
Dr. 0: Are his lawyers going to be able to get him free?
Dr. D: No.
Dr. 0: They did before.
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Dr. F: He might serve five years or so.
Dr. D: He was not charged with murder before.
Dr. F: Don't life murderers get out after ten years or so?
Dr. D: Some do but this one never will. Most of those that get
out - it is an episode in their lives - followed by good behavior. This
fellow of course now they find he has a terrible record, - two children
dead and the whole background of sexual misbehavior, so if they once
get him locked up I think he will stay there.
Dr. Ra: Why not string him up and let the state protect itself?
Dr. D: Society is just that sadistic. Society will delight in having
this fellow hang. They say what's the matter if he is insane-why not
string him up.
Dr. D. I think one reason people are trying to find a psychosis is
an attempt to be fair toward him. Personally we might like to see him
hang but I feel we must be fair as psychiatrists.
APPENDIX B
No comprehensive survey of the New Hampshire lawyers seeking to
evaluate the Bar's reaction to the New Hampshire doctrine has even been
conducted. Such a survey would not be very meaningful, however, since
very few attorneys have had any contact with it. Among the few who
have there is unqualified endorsement. As Judge Blandin said, referring to
the study he undertook for Professor Weihofen, "the data here is scanty.
However, not a single person among those whom I canvassed had the
slightest criticism of the rule, and all who expressed an opinion - and
this included most of them - were favorable to it." Perhaps the most
significant factor for non-New Hampshire skeptics to ponder is that the
judges and prosecutors polled felt the doctrine works well and that it
serves its purpose better than M'Naghten or Durham.
Frank R. Kenison, Chief Justice of the N.H. Supreme Court:
"My experience with the rule is somewhat limited and for the most
part confined to the period of time when I acted as County Solicitor,
Assistant Attorney General, and Attorney General. The New Hampshire
rule has never been any handicap to the prosecution where the defense
of insanity was raised. By the same token I have never heard the rule
criticized by defense attorneys in criminal cases. Occasionally one hears
a mild criticism to the effect that the test is no test at all and leaves
too much discretion in the jury. However, it has worked satisfactorily in
this state and there is evidence that it is being considered favorably in
other jurisdictions."
"The New Hampshire rule has worked successfully in this state. It
has not been criticized or found impractical by either prosecutors or
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defenders and the verdicts of juries under the New Hampshire rule
have reached a result which would seem more consistent with ordinary
wisdom than is possible under the M'Naghten Rules."
Francis W. Johnston, former Chief Justice of the N.H. Supreme
Court, Justice of the Superior Court, and Attorney General:
"My belief is that the N.H. Rule is a good one ....

The N.H. rule

seems simpler and more accurate. The jury is not required to find
specifically whether the defendant was capable of knowing the difference
between right and wrong or how much he was capable of understanding
otherwise or whether he had an irresistible impulse, all of which issues
must be difficult of determination."
Stephen M. Wheeler, Associate Justice N.H. Supreme Court, former
Chief Justice of the Superior Court, and Solicitor of Rockingham County:
"I have had no criticism of our rule, and such experience as I have
had with this type of case does not indicate the necessity for any change
therein. As a practical matter, it doesn't seem to make much difference
whether a respondent at the time of the commission of the act was
incapable of understanding the nature and quality of the act or that
it was wrong or '.

.

. the killing was the offspring or the product of

mental disease,' and I doubt if it would make much difference with the
jury. However, I believe our rule presents a better definition or yardstick
of insanity when used as a defense in criminal cases than the so-called
'right or wrong' test."
Amos N. Blandin, Jr., Associate Justice, N.H. Supreme Court, former
Associate Justice, N.H. Superior Court:
"For the past thirty years I have dealt rather extensively with
psychiatrists, and especially so during the last decade. From this association,
I have gathered that the profession has much to offer and that it also
has much to learn, as I think the majority of psychiatrists will agree. For
this reason, among others, I believe that the Durham rule, with its stress
on psychiatric evidence and on trying to keep up with the latest developments in that field, will often result merely in exchanging an old error for a
new, and perhaps a worse one. Our rule permitting the jury to weigh all the
testimony of both expert and lay witnesses seems to me far better at the
present state of our knowledge. In this way we will move a bit more slowly
but a bit more surely, as it gives an opportunity for time to prove or disprove
various and sometimes sharply conflicting psychiatric theories."
APPENDIX C
Recent Charges Under the New Hampshire Doctrine
There have not been many New Hampshire cases in which the issue
of insanity has actually gotten to the jury. In the few that have, the
court has more often than not stumbled over the question of fact and
has usually slipped into the "error" of treating some issues as matters
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of law. Following are three charges in which this has happened in
varying degrees.
In the first case, State v. Snow, the judge did not treat the New
Hampshire doctrine as posing a question of fact, but rather chose to
treat it as a test- i.e., a "product" test. He apparently agreed with
Judge Holtzoff who has contended that the "Pike and Durham formula"
does not change the law but merely is an addition to the M'Naghten
rule and the irresistible impulse test and suggested that the jury should
be given all three.* This is more or less what the judge in State v. Snow
did. He not only linked the New Hampshire terminology of "product"
with irresistible impulse (".

.

. the taking of the money with the intent

to deprive the owner [must be] the product of a diseased mind and
one that he could not control") but he even introduced the notion of
right-wrong and then formulated the "product" test as an addition to it:
"So you have to consider that on the question of whether or
not King Snow, on the night in question, was able to distinguish
say between right and wrong, and that on top of that the act was
not the product of a diseased mind."
In-the second case, State v. Goodrich, the court started out correctly
by stating that insanity was a question of fact. But the judge then turned
around and contradicted himself by ruling as a matter of law that if the
defendant "could form or entertain a criminal intent" or if "he had the
mental ability to control his actions, then reason must have prompted
his acts and they were not caused, nor produced by his abnormal mentality,
but were assented to and concurred in by his will and were criminal."
It was clearly error for the court to hold that if the defendant could
control his actions he was not insane. As has already been mentioned
there is some dispute whether it is error to require that the mental disease
take away the capacity to form or entertain a criminal intent. The court
was quoting from Judge Ladd's opinion in State v. Jones** which is usually
cited as the authority for that proposition. But Judge Doe, in charging
the jury in that case, did not mention intent and Ladd's words are mere
dictum.
In the third case, State v. Kowalski, the court did not mention intent.
Instead it followed rather closely Doe's charge in State v. Jones. In calling
the jury's attention to the possibility of irresistible impulse it did not
make the same error as the judge in State v. Goodrich and say that if
the defendant could not control his actions he was sane. Rather it ruled
that if the irresistiblo impulse impelled the defendant to commit the act
*United States v. Fielding, 148 F. Supp. 46, 51 (D.D.C. 1957).
**"At the trial where insanity is set up as a defence, two questions are presented:First: Had the prisoner a mental disease? Second: If he had, was the disease of such
a character, or was it so far developed, or had it so subjugated the powers of the
mind, as to take away the capacity to form or entertain a criminal intent?" State v. Jones,
50 N.H. 369, 393 (1871).
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in such a way that the
mental disease in him,"
had with this charge it
"product" as a question

jury found that "the killing was the product of
then he was not guilty. If any quarrel can be
is that the court did not leave the definition of
of fact but rather held that it meant causation
by ruling that "Insanity is not innocence unless it produced the killing."
This sentence was lifted from Judge Doe's charge in Jones, but the court
did not qualify it, as Doe did, by adding - "Whether an act may be
produced by partial insanity when no connection can be discovered between
the act and the disease, is a question of fact." In the other two charges
the court did not undertake to define "product."
In reading these charges it should be kept in mind that New Hampshire
judges are not allowed to comment on the evidence.
STATE v. SNOW'
"Now, the defense, first, has indicated an outright denial of everything
by the plea; says that he is not guilty. And they further say that at the
time alleged, if you should find that he did take the money, that he lacked
the capacity, mental capacity, to commit a crime because he lacked the
capacity to intend to commit a crime; in other words, that he was
suffering from what is known as mental derangement. It used to be
referred to as insanity. We call it mental derangement, but it has the
same effect.
"That means that on the day in question, or the night in question,
when he took the money, if he took it, that he was so far out of his
mind by reason of mental disease, that he had no control over his impulses;
in other words, that the taking of the money with the intent to deprive
the owner was the product of a diseased mind and one that he could
not control.
"If you could find that he could control his mind, and that the
taking was something of his own will, it makes no difference if he were
partially mentally deranged. If the taking of the money was produced
by a concurrence of his will and his mental disease, it would still be a
crime. The taking must be done by something he can't control, an impulse
that is the result of the product of a diseased mind. So you have to
consider that on the question of whether or not King Snow, on the night
in question, was able to distinguish say between right and wrong, and
that on top of that the act was not the product of a diseased mind.
"Now, he might be able to distinguish a little bit between right and
wrong, but he was still under the pressure of that mental situation, he
would still not be guilty. So it comes right down to the question who had
1.Respondent's Bill of Exceptions, pp. 50-1, State v. Snow, 98 N.H. 1,
93 A.2d 831 (1953).
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control, his diseased mind or himself normal. You have to decide that.
If he was not insane, then the act is a crime, and you would return a
verdict of guilty."
2
STATE v. GOODRICH

"Now, there is no hard and fast rule that may be applied to determine
whether a person is insane or not within the meaning of that term as used
in the criminal law. The question is whether the acts were the product
of mental disease at the time. Now, neither the presence or absence of
delusions, nor the knowledge of right and wrong, nor design, nor cunning,
nor lack in executing the crime, or in attempting to avoid detection, nor
ability or inability to learn in school, or to read or to remember, or to
transact business or perform labor, or to manage affairs or to tell the
truth is, as a matter of law, alone a test of mental capacity. Whether
the respondent had sufficient mental capacity to entertain a criminal intent
at the time is a question of fact for you, Mr. Foreman and gentlemen of
the jury. Was he so far deficient at the time that he was not able to
form or entertain a criminal intent? If so, then his acts were the product
and result of his abnormal mental condition. If, on the other hand, he
had the mental ability to control his actions, then reason must have
prompted his acts and they were not caused, nor produced by his abnormal
mentality, but were assented to and concurred in by his will and were
criminal.
"In passing upon these questions you should take into consideration
not only the appearance of the respondent on the witness stand, but all
of the evidence before you which has any bearing upon the symptoms,
phases or manifestations of abnormal mentality at the time. And from
the whole, using your best judgment and common sense, determine whether
the respondent did or did not have the mental capacity to entertain and
to carry into effect a criminal intent at the time that these acts were
alleged to have been committed. ...
"Now I will turn to the indictment with respect to aggravated
assault.... Now, if you find beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Goodrich
committed an assault, that is the act, the physical act of assault, then
here again insanity at the time would be a complete defense. I have
already explained to you what we mean by insanity, and it's a matter for
you, as I have told you with reference to the other indictment, for you
to determine whether at the time the respondent had sufficient mental
capacity to entertain the criminal intent. If there is any reasonable ground
to believe that the respondent did not have the use of his reason at
the time, then you must find him not guilty by reason of insanity."
2. State v. Goodrich, Grafton State Docket, No. 1668 & 1669 (1950).
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STATE v. KOWALSKI
"The defendant, as you know, has pleaded not guilty to this charge
and has introduced evidence that he was mentally deranged, insane, at
the time, and not responsible for his act or acts. If, applying the law as
I have laid it down, you find the defendant killed his wife in a manner
that would be criminal and unlawful if the defendant were sane, the
verdict would be 'Not guilty by reason of insanity,' if the killing was the
offspring or product of mental disease in the defendant. Whether the
defendant had a mental disease and whether the killing of his wife was
the product of such disease are questions of fact for you to determine
and decide. Insanity is a mental disease, disease in the mind. An act
produced by mental disease is not a crime. If the defendant had a
mental disease which irresistibly impelled him to kill his wife, if the
killing was the product of mental disease in him, he is not guilty. He is
as -innocent as if the act had been produced by another person using
his hand against the utmost resistance. Insanity is not innocence unless
it produced the killing. If the defendant had an insane impulse to kill
his wife and could have successfully resisted it, he is responsible. Whether
every insane impulse is always irresistible is a question of fact for you to
decide. Whether the defendant in this case had an irresistible impulse to
kill his wife, and whether he could have resisted it is a question of fact
for you to decide."
APPENDIX D
The flexibility of the New Hampshire doctrine can lead to unusual
situations in practice. In the case of State v. Grant,' for example, we find
the lawyers insisting that a defendant is mentally ill and should be in
the State Hospital and the psychiatrists insisting that he is legally sane
and should be in the jail or the Industrial School.
The defendant was indicted for Sodomy. After a period of observation
the State Hospital reported that he was not insane. This troubled the
County Solicitor, for the defendant was obviously feebleminded, and he
told the Court:
This is a case where he needs help more than punishment
but it would seem to be something that he is a danger to other
people and of course to send him to jail or something and then
it's the same situation all over again.
Grant pleaded guilty and at his hearing the following exchange
took place:
Defense Counsel: "He informs me in a very childish manner
that the reason he got off on this tangent was that they
sterilized him up at the Laconia School and he felt he could
1. State v. Grant, Strafford Criminal Docket No. 2622 (1952).
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have nothing to do with women and couldn't marry and realizing
the gravity of the offense that he would never do it again. Of
course I think that he should be in some institution where he
could have some psychiatric care and someone with some psychiatric
training and experience would be in a position to state whether
he should be let out in society or not. I don't think confining
him to a penal institution is the answer in this case. I think it
ought to be put back in the lap of the Examining Board of
the State Hospital."
The County Solicitor: "I think it would be a good idea to
put it back in their lap but I don't know whether that would
work or not. I am sure the Court knows more about it than
I do. Whether you have to be insane or something to be in
the State Hospital."
The Court: "Well I am going to defer sentence in this case until
tomorrow morning and contact the State Hospital in the morning.
The next day the defendant changed his plea to "not guilty by reason
of mental derangement." The County Solicitor accepted the plea and
the Court ordered the defendant to be committed at the State Hospital
"until discharged by due course of law." The State Hospital however
chose to regard the commitment as merely temporary, for purposes of
observation, and thirty-six days later sent the Court a report which was
more in the form of a protest.
Donald Grant, who was committed to the New Hampshire
State Hospital on September 12, 1952, for observation as to
-his sanity, has been observed and examined as to his sanity. As a
result of these observations and examinations, I have formed the
opinion that he is not insane and that he is not suitable for
continued custody in a hospital for the insane. Psychological
testing has revealed that he is feebleminded (intelligence quotient
-63) and that his judgment, from that cause, is defective.
"It has been suggested by the Strafford County Solicitor that
he might'be employed in some manner at the State Hospital and
at the same time be assisted by a psychiatrist. However, he is
not intellectually competent to work as an attendant caring for
mentally ill patients and for the same reason he is unable to
work in a State Hospital industry. Also, because he is feebleminded, he is not amenable to treatment by a psychiatrist. He
is considered to be in need of confinement and supervision for
the protection of the public, and to require training such as is
afforded in an institution for the feebleminded of the Laconia
State School type. Since the law prevents admission to the latter
institution, where I feel his care is indicated, it is my opinion
that he should be confined to the Industrial School or in a jail.
The lawyers did not appreciate the State Hospital's advice. As the
defense counsel saw it the psychiatrists were passing the buck:
"I think the difficulty in this case arises from the efforts on
the part of the Examining Board to shirk their responsibility and
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get rid of him from the State Hospital in Concord. Reading
their report they say he has a degree of mental defectiveness
and general immaturity. . . . I certainly agree and feel that this
man should be institutionalized but because of the fact that the
doctors at the State Hospital want to duck their responsibility
I don't think that this man because of that reason should be
sent to some penal institution."
The Court agreed and the defendant was left in the State Hospital.
Thus in this case the State Psychiatrists asserted that a feebleminded
person was not "legally insane." The lawyers insisted that he was. The
lawyers won.
APPENDIX E
Disposition of a case in which the State Hospital
Certifies the Respondent sane
Cases in which the question of mental competency arises in New
Hampshire follow a fairly regular pattern. The issue of insanity seldom
reaches the jury. In the average case the County Solicitor moves to
commit for observation and his motion is always granted. If the Hospital
reports that the accused is insane, the prosecution usually asks the grand
jury to certify that it refuses to indict by reason of insanity and the court
orders the defendant committed until released by due process of law.
In by far the majority of cases, however, the Hospital reports that the
patient is sane and comEetent to stand trial. He then usually enters a
plea of guilty, and is sentenced accordingly. A representative example is
the Howland case' which occurred in 1939. Referring to it recently,
the County Solicitor explained that he had petitioned for commitment
almost as a matter of routine.
"As I recall it, there were no particular facts in the Howland
case requiring an examination of the defendant, except that he
had quite a record elsewhere, and it is my recollection that my
motion was suggested by the State Police and the Attorney General
and such action seemed to be the common practice in all homicide
cases.
2
"So far as I know it is simply a practice of long standing."
Howland was indicted for first degree murder on February 2, 1939.
He was arraigned on March 30 and pleaded not guilty. At the arraignment
the County Solicitor filed the following motion:
"To any Justice of said Court:
"Counsel for the State in the above case respectively requests,
in accordance with the custom in such cases, that, there being a
question as to the sanity of the Respondent, the Court order
the Respondent into the care and custody of the Superintendent
1. State v. Henry Howland, Strafford Criminal Docket No. 2052 (1939).

2. Letter from John Beamis, Esquire, March 18, 1960.
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of the State Hospital in Concord in our County of Merrimack,
to be detained and observed by him until further order of the
Court, or until such person shall have been ordered discharged
from the hospital by the trustees upon a report to them by the
Superintendent that such person is not insane."
Dated at Dover, N.H., this 29th day of March, 1939.
Thomas P. Cheney (s)
Attorney General
John F. Beamis, Jr. (s)
County Solicitor
Beneath this petition the Court wrote the following order:
"Upon consideration of the foregoing petition, it is ordered that
the respondent John H. Howland be committed to the care and
the custody of the Superintendent of the State Hospital in
Concord in our County of Merrimack, there to be detained and
observed by him until further order of the Court."
March 30, 1939
Aloysius J. Connor (s)
Presiding Justice
The Sheriff delivered the accused to the State Hospital that very day.
On April 19, twenty days later, the State Hospital sent the Court the
following report:
"I have examined John H. Howland, committed to this
hospital for observation, and have formed the opinion that he
is sane."

Yours truly,
Chas. H. Dolloff (s)
Superintendent
On April 25, the Court ordered Howland transferred from the Hospital
to the county jail. On May 1st, he changed his plea to "guilty of murder
in 1st degree" and the following mittimus was entered:
"May 1, 1939-

Sentence

"It is ordered that the respondent be committed to the state
prison, there to be confined during the remainder of his life."
Aloysius J. Connor
P. J.
APPENDIX F
Disposition of a case in which the State Hospital
Certifies the Respondent insane
In New Hampshire the prosecution always accepts the State Hospital's
decision that a respondent is insane and rather than seek a conviction it
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asks the court to commit him as criminally insane. A typical case was
that of Byron Tenney,1 a very old man.
On January 3, 1957, the accused was bound over by the New London
Municipal Court on the charge of first degree murder. On the same day
the County Solicitor petitioned the Superior Court that the accused be
committed for observation and the petition was granted.
On February 14, the State Hospital filed the following report:
"Byron F. Tenney was admitted to this hospital on January 23,
1957 by order of judge Stephen M. Wheeler. His advanced age
and cardiovascular disease result in physical disability to the
extent that he is carried on our Danger List, implying the likelihood of imminent death.
"Complete physical, mental, and psychologic examinations
have disclosed that his mental condition, due to hardening of the
arteries in the brain, is such as to render him psychotic. He is
confused, disoriented, and often irrelevent, only fleetingly aware
of the reality about him. He is, therefore, incompetent mentally
and has been insane for a considerable period of time prior to
admission to the hospital. His behavior which constituted the
charges against him was, therefore, the product of disease."
On February 19 the Superior Court "sentenced" the accused to the
State Hospital under R.S.A. 135: 17 & 18.
At the April term of the Grand Jury the County Solicitor sought
an indictment against Tenney for murder. Across the front of the indictment
the foreman of the jury wrote:
"The Grand jury omit to find an indictment against Byron Tenney
for the reason of his insanity and the Grand Jury so certify that
finding to the Court."
On the same day, April 2, 1957, the Court ordered Tenney "committed
to the N.H. State Hospital for life, there to remain until or unless earlior
discharged, released or transferred by due course of law."
On December 15, 1959 the old man died, a patient at the State Hospital.
He had been arrested, committed for observation, adjudged insane, and
indefinitely committed as criminally insane without once having counsel
of record.

1. State v. Tenney, Merrimack State Docket, No. 400 and No. 408 (1957).

